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Abstract
This paper considers a simple model of credit risk and derives the limit distribution of losses
under diﬀerent assumptions regarding the structure of systematic risk and the nature of exposure
or firm heterogeneity. We derive fat-tailed correlated loss distributions arising from Gaussian
(i.e. non-fat-tailed) risk factors and explore the potential for (and limit of) risk diversification.
Where possible the results are generalized to non-Gaussian distributions. The theoretical results
indicate that if the firm parameters are heterogeneous but come from a common distribution,
for suﬃciently large portfolios there is no scope for further risk reduction through active port-
folio management. However, if the firm parameters come from diﬀerent distributions, say for
diﬀerent sectors or countries, then further risk reduction is possible, even asymptotically, by
changing the portfolio weights. In either case, neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to
underestimation of expected losses. But, once expected losses are controlled for, neglecting
parameter heterogeneity can lead to overestimation of risk, whether measured by unexpected
loss or value-at-risk. We examine the impact of sectoral and geographic diversification on credit
losses empirically using returns for firms in the U.S. and Japan across seven sectors and find that
ignoring this heterogeneity results in far riskier credit portfolios. Risk, is reduced significantly
when parameter heterogeneity is properly taken into account.
JEL Classifications: C33, G13, G21.
Key Words: Risk management, correlated defaults, credit loss distributions, heterogeneity,
diversification.
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1 Introduction
The distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk is an integral part of the canon of cor-
porate finance. The simple capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is perhaps its best known form.
Idiosyncratic risk is readily diversified, leaving the investor exposed to systematic risk, the non-
diversifiable component. But firms have diﬀerent sensitivities to systematic risk, and systematic
risk itself may be multi-dimensional with distinct risk types originating in specific industries, sec-
tors or regions. In general, the potential for portfolio diversification then is driven broadly by these
two characteristics: the degree to which systematic risk factors are correlated with each other and
the degree of dependence of individual firms on diﬀerent risk factors.
Although this paradigm has been developed for the analysis of risk in liquid market assets, it is
nevertheless relevant to an investor in less liquid credit assets where obligor default is an event of
particular interest. Models of the joint distribution of losses from a portfolio of credit assets form
the cornerstone for a variety of applications in finance, from credit risk management to the pricing
of credit assets such as CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) and credit derivatives. Credit risk
analysis introduces another source of heterogeneity, namely the default threshold. This may vary
across firms due, for instance, to diﬀerent capital structures, and across countries because of, say,
diﬀerent bankruptcy laws.
In this paper we examine the scope for and limits of diversification for a credit portfolio. We
derive analytical results for the portfolio loss distribution and present some complementary empir-
ical findings. We do so for a wide set of diﬀerent assumptions that underlie diﬀerent aspects of
the analysis of credit risk. The theoretical results indicate that if the firm parameters are hetero-
geneous but come from a common distribution, there is no scope for further risk reduction for a
suﬃciently large portfolio, i.e. one where idiosyncratic risk has already been diversified away. This
would preclude gains from active portfolio management by changing the exposure weights (unless
the portfolio is small, of course). However, if the firm parameters come from diﬀerent distribu-
tions, say for diﬀerent sectors or countries, then risk reduction is possible, even asymptotically,
by changing the portfolio weights. In either case, neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead
to underestimation of expected losses (EL). But once EL is controlled for, neglecting parameter
heterogeneity can lead to overestimation of unexpected losses or risk, whether measured by loss
volatility, unexpected loss (UL), or value-at-risk (VaR).
Some of the analytical results are illustared using a large, two country (U.S. and Japan) portfolio.
Return regressions with diﬀerent degrees of parameter heterogeniety are estimated recursively using
ten-year rolling estimation windows, with the loss distributions simulated for six out-of-sample one-
year periods. The results are found to be robust across the six years. It is shown that, for a given
EL, risk is significantly reduced when parameter heterogeneity is taken into account. Importantly,
the introduction of parameter heterogeneity allows one to exploit diversification potential that
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seems to exist in the selected sample portfolio. Since credit portfolio models impose conditional
independence on firm returns, proper specification of the conditional mean (firm returns) and the
default threshold work hand in glove. If conditional independence is violated, i.e. if there remains
cross-sectional dependence in the residuals through poorly specified return regressions, then risk will
be underestimated. Grouping firms by their credit rating, i.e. just seven groups instead of N (the
number of obligors), seems to capture most of the relevant heterogeneity needed for determining
the default threshold. We also find that allowing for country specific factor loadings is important,
but country specific factors seem to be less important by comparison.
The credit risk literature has recognized for some time the importance of modeling correlated
or dependent defaults. Early treatment can be traced to the single (unobserved) factor model due
to Vasicek (1987, 1991), which also forms the basis of New Basel Accord (BCBS, 2004) as outlined
in detail by Gordy (2003). Extensions to multiple factors were proposed by Wilson (1997a,b) and
Gupton, Finger and Bhatia (1997) in the form of the industry credit portfolio model CreditMet-
rics. For a summary of this and other industry models, see Saunders and Allen (2002), and for
detailed comparisons, see Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998), Crouhy et al. (2000), and Gordy (2000).
Practically all of these models are adaptations of Merton’s (1974) options based approach, which
develops a simple model of firm performance with a threshold value below which the firm defaults.
In empirical applications the default threshold is modeled as a function of the firm’s balance sheet.
Not only is accounting information a noisy and possibly unreliable indicator of a firm’s health, but
in a multi-country setting it presents the additional challenges of diﬀerent accounting standards
and bankruptcy rules. In view of these measurement problems, Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler
and Weiner (2004), who link a credit risk model to a global macroeconometric multifactor model,
propose an alternative estimation approach using firm-specific credit ratings and historical default
frequencies.
A separate line of research has focused on correlated default intensities as in Schönbucher (1998),
Duﬃe and Singleton (1999), Duﬃe and Gârleanu (2001) and Duﬃe and Wang (2004). There are
a host of other approaches, including the contagion model of Davis and Lo (2001) as well as
Giesecke and Weber’s (2004) indirect dependence approach, where default correlation is introduced
through local interaction of firms with their business partners as well as via global dependence on
economic risk factors. The idea of generalizing default dependence beyond correlation using copulas
is discussed in Li (2000), Embrechts, McNeil and Straumann (2001), Schönbucher (2002) and Frey
and McNeil (2003).
Perhaps the most important distinction between our approach and the literature is around firm
(or asset) heterogeneity: the risky asset pricing literature typically develops a model for a repre-
sentative bond or firm.1 Naturally, there will always be idiosyncratic or firm-specific diﬀerences,
1To be sure, one can find mention of multi-factor risk sensitivity (e.g. Duﬃe and Singleton (2003, Section 11.3.3)),
but to our knowledge this topic has received at best casual treatment.
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also allowed for in the risky asset pricing models. But our interest is in explicitly allowing for firm
heterogeneity with respect to both the default threshold (or distance to default) and systematic
risk sensitivity, an important dimension of diversification. Along the way we will be able to derive
fat-tailed correlated losses from Gaussian (i.e. non-fat-tailed) risk factors and explore the potential
for (and limits of) cross-sector and/or cross-country risk diversification.
The important technical problem of deriving the joint distribution of losses has received consid-
erable attention of late. An early contribution was made by Vasicek in 1987, and then elaborated
on in 1991, with the introduction of a single risk factor model with equicorrelated homogeneous
exposures. Our model builds on Vasicek’s results.
All of these studies in the first instance focus their modeling attention on the cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF) of losses rather than its density. However, by working with CDFs, the
researcher is typically limited to those with closed form solutions. Our strategy is to work instead
with the probability density function (PDF) of losses allowing for broader generalizations, and these
PDFs then may, or may not, have corresponding analytical CDFs. If not, this is not necessarily a
problem as numerical solutions are often easily obtainable.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model of firm
value and default, and Section 3 provides more detail regarding the specification and identification
of the default threshold. Section 4 considers the problem of correlated defaults. Section 5 derives
the portfolio loss distribution under diﬀerent heterogeneity assumptions, starting with the simple
case of a homogeneous portfolio as introduced by Vasicek. In Section 6 we derive asymptotic
expressions for the loss density and distribution functions for normal and Student t distributed
firm innovations, again under both parameter homogeneity and heterogeneity assumptions. In
Section 7 we allow loss-given-default to be correlated with the systematic risk factor(s), and the
potential of sectoral and geographic diversification is discussed in Section 8. Section 9 explores
the impact of heterogeneity empirically using returns for firms in the U.S. and Japan across seven
sectors and analyzing the resulting loss distributions by simulation. Section 10 provides some
concluding remarks.
2 Firm Value and Default
Much of the research on credit risk modelling is based on the option theoretic default model of
Merton (1974). Merton recognized that a lender is eﬀectively writing a put option on the assets of
the borrowing firm; owners and owner-managers (i.e. shareholders) hold the call option. If the value
of the firm falls below a certain threshold, the owners will put the firm to the debt-holders. Thus
a firm is expected to default when the value of its assets falls below a threshold value determined
by its liabilities.
Consider a firm i having asset value Vit at time t, and an outstanding stock of debt, Dit. Under
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the Merton model default occurs at the maturity date of the debt, t + h, if the firm’s assets,
Vi,t+h, are less than the face value of the debt at that time, Di,t+h. A more nuanced approach
is taken by the first-passage models (e.g. Black and Cox, 1976) where default would occur the
first time that Vi,t falls below a default boundary (or threshold) over the period t to t + h.2 The
default probabilities are computed with respect to the probability distribution of asset values at
the terminal date, t+h in the case of the Merton model, and over the period from t to t+h in the
case of the first-passage model. Therefore, the Merton approach may be thought of as a European
option and the first-passage approach as an American option. Our analysis can be adapted to both
of these models, but in what follows we focus on Merton’s specification.
The value of the firm at time t is the sum of debt and equity, namely
Vit = Dit +Eit, with Dit > 0. (1)
Conditional on time t information, default will take place at time t+ h if
Vi,t+h ≤ Di,t+h.
Because default is costly and violations to the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings are
common, in practice shareholders have an incentive to put the firm into receivership even before
the equity value of the firm hits the zero value.3 Similarly, the bank might also have an incentive
of forcing the firm to default once the firm’s equity falls below a non-zero threshold.4 Importantly,
default in a credit relationship is typically a weaker condition than outright bankruptcy. An obligor
may meet the technical default condition, e.g. a missed coupon payment, without subsequently
going into bankruptcy. This distinction is particularly relevant in the banking-borrower relationship
we seek to characterize.5
As a result we shall assume that default takes place if
0 < Ei,t+h < Ci,t+h, (2)
where Ci,t+h is a positive default threshold which could vary over time and with the firm’s particular
characteristics (such as region or industry sector). Natural candidates include quantitative factors
such as leverage, profitability, firm age (most of which appear in models of firm default), as well as
more qualitative factors such as management quality.6
2For a review of these models, see, for example, Lando (2004, Chapter 3). More recent modeling approaches also
allow for strategic default considerations, as in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997).
3See, for instance, Leland and Toft (1996) who develop a model where default is determined endogenously, rather
than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition.
4For a treatment of this scenario, see Garbade (2001).
5An excellent example of the joint borrower-lender decision process is given by Lawrence and Arshadi (1995).
6For models of bankruptcy and default at the firm level, see, for instance, Altman (1968), Lennox (1999), Shumway
(2001), and Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004).
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We are now in a position to consider the evolution of firm value which we assume follows a
standard geometric random walk model:
ln(Ei,t+1) = ln(Eit) + µi + ξi,t+1, ξi,t+1 ∼ iidN(0, σ2ξi), (3)
with a non-zero drift, µi, and idiosyncratic Gaussian innovations with a zero mean and firm-specific
volatility, σξi . Consequently, the value of firm i at time t+ h is
ln(Ei,t+h) = ln(Eit) + hµi +
hX
s=1
ξi,t+s.
and by (2) default occurs if
ln(Ei,t+h) = ln(Ei,t) + hµi +
hX
s=1
ξi,t+s < ln (Ci,t+h) , (4)
or if the h-period change in equity value or return falls below the log-threshold-equity ratio, λi,t+h,
defined by
ln
µ
Ei,t+h
Eit
¶
< ln
µ
Ci,t+h
Eit
¶
= λi,t+h. (5)
Equation (5) tells us that the relative (rather than absolute) decline in firm value must be large
enough over the horizon h to result in default. Using (4), default occurs if
hµi +
hX
s=1
ξi,t+s < λi,t+h,
Therefore, under (3) the probability that firm i defaults at the terminal date t+ h is given by
πi,t+h = Φ
Ã
λi,t+h − h µi
σξi
√
h
!
, (6)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
3 Specification and Identification of Default Thresholds
Equation (6) provides a functional relationship between a firm’s equity returns (as characterized
by µi and σξi), its default threshold, λi,t+h, and the default probability, πi,t+h. In the case of
publicly traded companies, µi and σξi can be consistently estimated from market returns based on
historical data using either rolling or expanding observation windows. In general, however, λi,t+h
and πi,t+h can not be directly observed. One possibility would be to use balance sheet and other
accounting data to estimate λi,t+h. This approach, for instance, is taken by KMV. But as argued in
Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and Weiner (2004, PSTW), the accounting information are likely to
be noisy and might not be all that reliable due to information asymmetries of managers, share-, and
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debtholders.7 Moreover, in a multi-country setting, the accounting based route presents additional
challenges such as diﬀerent accounting standards and bankruptcy rules that exist across countries.
In addition to accounting data, other firm characteristics, such as leverage, firm age and perhaps
size, and management quality could also be important in the determination of default thresholds
that are quite diﬃcult to observe. The accounting-based estimates of λi,t+h are also likely to be
highly data intensive, often requiring propriety information not readily available to general academic
and professional researchers. In view of these measurement problems, PSTW propose an alternative
estimation approach where firm-specific default thresholds are obtained using firm-specific credit
ratings and historical default frequencies.
Suppose that at the end of period t firm i is assigned a credit rating which we denote by Rt.
Typically Rt may take on values such as ‘Aaa’, ‘Aa’, ‘Baa’,..., ‘Caa’ in Moody’s terminology, or
‘AAA’, ‘AA’, ‘BBB’,..., ‘CCC’ in Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch’s terminology. Suppose also
that over the period, t to t+ h the observed default frequency of R-rated firms is given by πˆR,t+h.
Therefore, under (3) and assuming that the number of R-rated firms are suﬃciently large, we have
πˆR,t+h =
X
i∈Rt
witΦ
Ã
λi,t+h − h µ¯i
σ¯ξi
√
h
!
, (7)
where µ¯i and σ¯ξi are the unconditional estimates of µi and σξi obtained using observations on
firm-specific returns up to the end of period t, and wit is the weight of the ith firm in the portfolio
of R-rated firms at the end of period t, with Pi∈Rt wit = 1. The number of R-rated firms at the
end of period t will be denoted by NtR.
The consistency of the above estimating equation requires wit to be pre-determined and non-
dominating. Clearly, other grouping of firms can also be entertained. For example, firms can be
grouped by industry or geographical regions as well as by their credit ratings. It would also be
possible to consider averaging over firms with particular rating histories. For example, all firms that
stayed within the same rating category for two successive periods (quarters, say), or those firms
showing an improvement (deterioration) in their credit ratings over the two successive periods,
t− 1 and t could be included as separate categories (types). In considering these and many other
“types” three important considerations ought to be born in mind. Firstly, the types should be
reasonably homogeneous from the stand-point of default. Secondly, the number of firms of the
same type must be suﬃciently large so that the estimating equation (7) holds. Thirdly, there must
be non-zero incidence of defaults across firms of the same type, namely πˆR,t+h 6= 0. Within type
homogeneity is required since equation (7) contains NtR unknown threshold parameters, λi,t+h i ∈
Rt. Their identification would require imposing a certain degree of homogeneity restrictions across
the parameters, and/or one could find new moment conditions that relate the default thresholds to
7With this in mind, Duﬃe and Lando (2001) allow for the possibility of imperfect information about the firm’s
assets and default threshold in the context of a first-passage model.
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the other characteristics of the empirical distribution of firm defaults. In what follows we consider
two alternative exact identification schemes:
1. Within type homogeneity of defaults thresholds, namely
λi,t+h = λR,t+h, for all i ∈ Rt. (8)
2. Within type homogeneity of distance-to-default
DDi,t+h =
λi,t+h − h µ¯i
σ¯ξi
√
h
= DDR,t+h, for all i ∈ Rt. (9)
Under the first identification scheme, the common default threshold, λR,t+h, can be obtained
by solving the following non-linear equation in λR,t+h
X
i∈Rt
witΦ
Ã
λR,t+h − h µ¯i
σ¯ξi
√
h
!
− πˆR,t+h = 0 (10)
It is easily seen that this equation has a unique, finite solution so long as πˆR,t+h 6= 0. Under the
second identification scheme
λˆi,t+h = DDR,t+h σ¯ξi
√
h+ h µ¯i, for i ∈ Rt, (11)
where
DDR,t+h = Φ−1 (πˆR,t+h) , (12)
and Φ−1 (·) is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.8 Once
again the estimated default thresholds, λˆi,t+h, will be finite so long as πˆR,t+h 6= 0. Out of the two,
the assumption of the same distance-to-default seems more in line with the way credit ratings are
established by the main rating companies. First, the idea that firms with similar distances-to-default
have similar probabilities of default is central to structural models of default. For instance, KMV
makes use of a one-to-one mapping from DDs to EDFs (expected default frequencies). Second,
rating agencies attempt to group firms according to their probability of default (subject possibly to
some adjustments for diﬀerences in their expected loss given defaults), and in a structural model
this is equivalent to grouping firms according to distance-to-default. In our empirical analysis we
shall focus on the threshold estimates given by (11), with a brief discussion of the sensitivity of
the results to other choices of λi,h+t. In the theoretical discussions that follows we shall assume
that the firm-specific default thresholds are given, and do not consider the eﬀects of their sampling
uncertainty on the analysis of loss distributions.
8Note that Φ−1 (πi,t+h) < 0 for πi,t+h < 0.5. In practice πi,t+h tends to be quite small.
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4 Cross Firm Default Correlations
In the context of the Merton model the cross firm default correlations can be introduced by assuming
the shocks to the firm asset values, ξi,t+1, defined by (3), to have the following multifactor structure
ξi,t+1 = γ0ift+1 + σiεi,t+1, εi,t+1 ∼ iid(0, 1) (13)
where ft+1 is an m × 1 vector of common factors, γi is the associated vector of factor loadings,
and εi,t+1 is the firm-specific idiosyncratic shock, assumed to be distributed independently across i.
The common factors could be treated as unobserved or observed through macroeconomic variables
such as output growth, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates.9 In what follows we suppose the
factors are unobserved, distributed independently of εi,t+1, and have constant variances.10 Thus,
without loss of generality we assume that ft+1 ∼ (0, Im), where Im is an identity matrix of order
m.11
The above multifactor model plays a central role in the analysis of market risk, and its use in
credit risk analysis seems a natural step towards a more cohesive understanding of the two types of
risks and their relationships to one another. A homogeneous version of the factor model has also
been used extensively for the analysis of credit portfolio risk by Vasicek (1987, 1991), as we shall
see to good eﬀect. But under homogeneity of factor loadings where γi = γ and γ0ift+1 = γ0ft+1,
then the distinction between a one factor and multifactor models will be redundant. Therefore,
for multifactor analysis it is essential that we allow the factor loadings to be heterogeneous across
firms.
Using (13) in (3) we now have
ln(Ei,t+1)− ln(Eit) = ri,t+1 = µi + γ0ift+1 + σiεi,t+1, (14)
and it is easily seen that
σ2ξi = γ
0
iγi + σ2i . (15)
The presence of the common factors also introduces a varying degree of asset return correlations
across firms, which in turn leads to cross firm default correlations for a given set of default thresh-
olds, λi,t+1. The extent of default correlation depends on the size of the factor loadings, γi, the
importance of the idiosyncratic shocks, σi, the values of the default thresholds, λi,t+1, and the
9PSTW provide an empirical implementation of this model by linking the (observable) factors, ft+1, to the variables
in a global vector autoregressive model.
10The more general case where the factors may exhibit time varying volatility can be readily dealt with by allowing
the factor loadings to vary over time, in line with market volatilities. But in this paper we shall not pursue this line
of research, primarily because the focus of our empirical analysis is on quarterly and annual default risks, and over
such horizons asset return volatilities appear to be rather limited and of second order importance.
11The issues concerning the empirical implementation of the multifactor models in the context of credit risk models
will be discussed in Section 9.
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shape of the distribution assumed for εi,t+1, particularly its left tail properties. The correlation
coeﬃcient of returns of firms i and j is given by
ρij =
γ0iγj¡
σ2i + γ0iγi
¢1/2 ³σ2j + γ0jγj´1/2 =
δ0iδj¡
1 + δ0iδi
¢1/2 ¡
1 + δ0jδj
¢1/2 , (16)
where δi = γi/σi, the standardized factor loadings. Assuming δi and δj are independently distrib-
uted the average pair-wise correlation of asset returns is fixed and given by
E
¡
ρij
¢
= E
Ã
δ0ip
1 + δ0iδi
!
E

 δjq
1 + δ0jδj

 .
The cross correlation of firm defaults, which we denote by ρ∗ij , is more complicated to derive.
Let zi,t+1 to be the default outcome for firm i, over a single period such that12
zi,t+1 = I (λi − ri,t+1) , (17)
where I(A) is an indicator function that takes the value of unity if A ≥ 0, and zero otherwise. Then
ρ∗ij =
E (zi,t+1zj,t+1)− πi,t+1πj,t+1p
πi,t+1(1− πi,t+1)
p
πj,t+1(1− πj,t+1)
(18)
where πi,t+1 = E (zi,t+1) is firm i0s default probability over the period t to t+ 1. Using the return
equation, (14), and the default criterion, (??), it is easily seen that ρ∗ij = 0 if γi = 0 for all
i and j; namely conditional independence in returns carries over to defaults. For non-zero factor
loadings relatively simple expressions for ρ∗ij can be obtained assuming (ft+1, εi,t+1) have a Gaussian
distribution. In this case
πi,t+1 = πi = Φ

 λi − µiq
σ2i + γ0iγi

 . (19)
The argument of Φ(·) in (19) is commonly referred to as a “distance to default” (DD) such that
DDi = Φ−1(πi). See also (9) and (12). To derive an expression for E (zi,t+1zj,t+1) we first note that
conditional on ft+1, zi,t+1 and zj,t+1 are independently distributed and
E (zi,t+1zj,t+1) = Ef [E (zi,t+1zj,t+1 |ft+1 )] (20)
= Ef [E (zi,t+1 |ft+1 )E (zj,t+1 |ft+1 )] .
Also
E (zi,t+1 |ft+1 ) = E
¡
I
¡
λi − µi − γ0ift+1 − σiεi,t+1
¢ |ft+1 ¢
= Φ
µ
λi − µi − γ0ift+1
σi
¶
= Φ
¡
ai − δ0ift+1
¢
,
12To simplify the exposition, and without any loss of generality, we set h = 1 and assume that default thresholds
are time-invariant. These assumptions can be readily relaxed.
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where as before δi = γi/σi and ai = σ−1i (λi − µi).13 Hence, unconditionally
E (zi,t+1zj,t+1) = Ef
£
Φ
¡
ai − δ0ift+1
¢
Φ
¡
aj − δ0jft+1
¢¤
, (21)
where the expectations are now taken with respect to the distribution of the common factors, ft+1.
5 Losses in a Credit Portfolio
Consider now a credit portfolio composed of N diﬀerent credit assets such as loans, each with
exposures or weights wit, at time t, for i = 1, 2, .., N , such that14
NX
i=1
wit = 1,
NX
i=1
w2it = O
¡
N−1
¢
, wit ≥ 0. (22)
A suﬃcient condition for (22) to hold is given by wit = O
¡
N−1
¢
, which is the standard granularity
condition where no single exposure dominates the portfolio.15 In what follows, for expositional
simplicity, we shall be suppressing the time subscript on the portfolio weights unless they are
specifically needed. It is straightforward to allow the weights to be time varying, given that at any
point in time they are typically predetermined.
Suppose further that loss-given-default (LGD) of obligor i is denoted by ϕi,t+1 which lies in the
range [0, 1].16 ,17 Under this set-up the portfolio loss over the period t to t+ 1 is given by
cN,t+1 =
NX
i=1
witϕi,t+1zi,t+1. (23)
In cases where for each i, ϕi,t+1 and zi,t+1 are independently distributed, the analysis can be
conducted conditional on given values of LGD. In such a case the ϕi,t+1’s could be treated as fixed
values and absorbed in the portfolio weights without loss of generality. However, a more interesting,
and arguably practically more relevant case, arises where ϕi,t+1 and zi,t+1 are correlated through
common business cycle eﬀects. This case presents new technical diﬃculties and is addressed briefly
in Section 7. Until then, and without loss of generality, let ϕi,t+1 = 1 ∀i, t, meaning that a defaulted
13Note that ai reduces to the distance to default, DDi, defined above when γi = 0.
14The assumption that N is time-invariant is made for simplicity and can be relaxed.
15Conditions (22) on the portfolio weights was in fact embodied in the initial proposal of the New Basel Accord
in the form of the Granularity Adjustments which was designed to mitigate the eﬀects of significant single-borrower
concentrations on the credit loss distribution. See BCBS (2001, Ch.8).
16LGD is often modelled by assuming that ϕi,t+1 follows a Beta distribution across i with parameters calibrated
to match the mean and standard deviation of historical observations on the severity of credit losses.
17Lenders, be they banks or bondholders, often experience a technical default (e.g. a missed coupon payment or
a breach of a covenant) without a loss, resulting in LGD = 0. Moreover, it is possible for LGD < 0, meaning that
recovery exceeds exposure (i.e. > 100%). This may arise when the coupon rate of the debt instrument (loan or bond)
exceeds the current interest rate.
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asset has no recovery value, and write (23) as
cN,t+1 =
NX
i=1
witzi,t+1. (24)
The probability distribution function of cN,t+1 can now be derived both conditional on an
information set, It, available at time t, or unconditionally. The two types of distributions coincide
when the factors, ft+1, are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, a case often maintained in the
literature. In this paper we consider a dynamic factor model and allow the factors to be serially
correlated. In particular, we shall assume that ft+1 follows a covariance stationary process, and It
contains at least ft and its lagged values, or their determinants (proxies) when they are unobserved.
A simple example of a dynamic factor model is the Gaussian vector autoregressive specification
ft+1 = Λf t + ηt, ηt | It ∼ iidN(0,Ωηη), (25)
where It is the public information known at time t, and Λ is an m×m matrix of fixed coeﬃcients
with all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle such that
V ar (ft+1 | It) =
∞X
s=0
ΛsΩηηΛ0s = Im. (26)
Along with much of the literature on credit risk, the focus of our analysis will be on the limit
distribution of cN,t+1 | It, as N → ∞. The limit properties of this conditional loss distribution
establishes the degree to which diversification of the credit portfolio is possible.18 Not surprisingly,
the limit distribution of the credit portfolio will depend on the nature of the return process {ri,t+1}
and the extent to which the returns are cross-sectionally correlated.
5.1 Credit Risk under Firm Homogeneity
Vasicek (1987) was among the first to consider the limit distribution of cN,t+1 using asset return
equations with a factor structure. However, he focused on the perfectly homogeneous case with the
same factor loadings, γi = γ, the same default thresholds, λi = λ, the same firm-specific volatil-
ities, σi = σ, and zero unconditional returns, µi = 0. As noted earlier a multifactor model with
homogeneous factor loadings is equivalent to a single factor model. Under Vasicek’s homogeneity
assumptions we have
ri,t+1 = γft+1 + σ εi,t+1,
where the single factor ft+1 is also assumed to be serially uncorrelated. In this model the pair-wise
asset return correlations, ρij , will be identical for all obligor pairs in the portfolio and is given by
ρij = ρ =
γ2
σ2 + γ2
. (27)
18The concept of “diversity” of financial markets has been recently discussed by Fernholz, Karatzas and Kardaras
(2003), who provide a formal analysis in the context of the standard geometric Brownian motion model of asset
returns.
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Furthermore, since default depends on the sign of λ − ri,t+1 = λ − (γft+1 + σ εi,t+1) , and not its
magnitude, without loss of generality the normalization, σ2+ γ2 = 1 is often used in the literature,
thus yielding γ = ±√ρ. The remaining parameter, λ, is then calibrated to a pre-specified default
probability, π, assuming a joint Gaussian distribution for ft+1 and εi,t+1:Ã
εi,t+1
ft+1
!
| It ∼ iidN (0, I2) . (28)
Under the above assumptions it is easily seen that
π = E (cN,t+1) =
NX
i=1
witE(zi,t+1) = E(zi,t+1) = Pr (ri,t+1 ≤ λ) = Φ (λ) .
Vasicek’s model, therefore, takes the following simple form
ri,t+1 =
√
ρft+1 +
p
1− ρ εi,t+1, (29)
with the default threshold given by
λ = Φ−1 (π) , (30)
so that the distance to default and default thresholds are the same. In Vasicek’s model the pair-wise
correlation of firm defaults, ρ∗ij , is the same across all firms and is given by (see (18) and (21))
ρ∗ij = ρ
∗ (π, ρ) =
E
½h
Φ
³
Φ−1(π)√
1−ρ −
q
ρ
1−ρft+1
´i2¾
− π2
π(1− π) , (31)
where expectations are taken with respect to the distribution of ft+1, assumed to be N(0, 1). For
example, for the standard parameter values π = 0.01, and ρ = 0.30, we have ρ∗ = 0.05. In Figure
1, the top left chart labeled “Gaussian” (we shall return to the other charts in Section 5.4 below)
provides simulated plots of ρ∗ (ρ, π) against ρ, for a few selected values of π. It is clear that the
default correlation, ρ∗, is related non-linearly to ρ, and tends to be considerably lower than ρ. Also
there is a clear tendency for the (ρ∗, ρ) relationship to shift downwards as π is reduced. For very
small values of π, sizable default correlations are predicted by the double-Gaussian Vasicek model
only for very high values of return correlations.19
5.2 Limits to Diversification - Vasicek’s Model
Since the underlying returns are correlated, there is a non-zero lower bound to the unconditional
loss variance, V ar (cN,t+1), and full diversification will not be possible. Under the Vasicek model
V ar (cN,t+1 | It) = π(1− π)


NX
j=1
w2jt

+ π(1− π)ρ∗


NX
j 6=j0
wjtwj0t

 ,
19Determinants of ρ∗ in the case where the errors have Student-t distribution with the same degree of freedom is
discussed below. In particular, see (36).
13
where π = E (zj,t+1) and ρ∗ is defined by (31) or by (36) below for Student-t errors. Since,PN
j=1wj = 1, it is easily seen that
NX
j=1
w2jt +
NX
j 6=j0
wjtwj0t = 1,
so that
V ar (cN,t+1 | It) = π(1− π)


ρ
∗ + (1− ρ∗)
NX
j=1
w2jt


 . (32)
Under the granularity condition, (22), for N suﬃciently large the second term in brackets become
negligible, and V ar (cN,t+1) converges to the first term which will be non-zero for ρ∗ 6= 0. Hence,
in the limit, (32) converges to
lim
N→∞
V ar (cN,t+1 | It) = π(1− π)ρ∗. (33)
For a finite value of N , the unexpected loss is minimized by adopting an equal weighted portfolio,
with wj = 1/N . For suﬃciently large N , only the granularity condition (22) matters, and nothing
can be gained by further optimization with respect of the weights, wj .
5.3 Vasicek’s Limit Distribution
The loss distribution for the perfectly homogeneous model is derived in Vasicek (1991, 2002) and
Gordy (2000). Denoting the fraction of the portfolio lost to defaults by x, he obtains the following
limiting density (as N →∞)
fc (x | It) =
r
1− ρ
ρ



φ
h√
1−ρΦ−1(x)−Φ−1(π)√
ρ
i
φ [Φ−1(x)]


 , for 0 < x ≤ 1, ρ 6= 0, (34)
where φ (·) is the density function of a standard normal. The associated cumulative loss distribution
function is
Fc (x | It) = Φ
·√
1− ρΦ−1(x)− Φ−1(π)
√
ρ
¸
. (35)
As can be seen, Vasicek’s limiting (as N → ∞) credit loss distribution is fully determined by two
parameters, namely the default probability, π, and the pair-wise return correlation coeﬃcient, ρ.
The former sets the expected loss of the portfolio, whilst the latter controls the shape of the loss
distribution. In eﬀect one parameter, ρ, controls all aspects of the loss distribution: its volatility,
skewness and kurtosis. It would not be possible to calibrate two Vasicek loss distributions with
the same expected and unexpected losses, but with diﬀerent degrees of fat-tailedness, for example.
Also, Vasicek’s distribution does not depend on the portfolio weights so long as (22) is satisfied.
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5.4 Default Correlations of Vasicek’s Model under Non-Gaussian Distributions
It is well known that asset return distributions are fat-tailed and its neglect might result in under
estimation of default correlations. In the context of Vasicek’s model the importance of this issue
can be investigated by considering t distributions for the innovations (εi,t+1 and/or ft+1) with low
degrees of freedom, tv, where v > 2 denotes the degrees of freedom of the distribution. When
εi,t+1 is Gaussian but ft+1 ∼ iid tv, the computation of the default correlation coeﬃcient, ρ∗, is
straightforward and can be carried out using (31) with ft+1 generated as draws from iid tv.
However, the derivations are more complicated when εi,t+1 is t distributed. In this case we must
assume that εi,t+1 and ft+1 are both t distributed with the same degrees of freedom, otherwise ri,t+1,
given by (29), will have a non-standard distribution and the threshold parameter, λ, can not be
derived analytically in terms of π. But when εi,t+1 and ft+1 are both t distributed with the same
degrees of freedom, v, then ri,t+1 will also be t distributed with v degrees of freedom and we have
π = Pr (ri,t+1 ≤ λ) = Tv (λ) ,
where Tv (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of tv, and hence, λ = T−1v (π). Also
E (zi,t+1 |ft+1 ) = E
h
I
³
λ−√ρft+1 −
p
1− ρ εi,t+1
´
|ft+1
i
= Tv
µ
λ√
1− ρ −
r
ρ
1− ρft+1
¶
.
Using this result in (20) and then in (18) now yields
ρ∗ (π, ρ, v) =
Ef
½h
Tv
³
T−1v (π)√
1−ρ −
q
ρ
1−ρft+1
´i2¾
− π2
π(1− π) , (36)
which is comparable to (31) obtained for Gaussian innovations. Expectations here are taken with
respect to the distribution of ft+1 assumed to be distributed as tv.
Figure 1 contains simulated plots of ρ∗ (ρ, π, v) against ρ, for a few selected values of π and for
three values of v: 10, 5 and 3. As the innovations become increasingly fat-tailed, i.e. as v declines,
the curve becomes steeper meaning that default correlation ρ∗ increases more dramatically as return
correlation, ρ, goes up. Moreover, diﬀerences in the default probability, π, matter less as the lines
collapse on top of one another. Note the Gaussian case in the upper left representing v =∞. Taken
together it is clear that as innovations become more fat-tailed, the return correlation becomes the
more important determinant of credit risk compared to the average default probability π, and
they can potentially generate extremely large tail losses. For example, using (33) and (31), the
unexpected loss of a Gaussian portfolio with π = 0.01, ρ = 0.3 is 0.021, whilst the unexpected loss
of the same portfolio but with t3 distributed shocks is 0.038.20
20This latter result is obtained using (33) and (36),
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5.5 Credit Risk with Firm Heterogeneity
Building on Vasicek’s work we now consider models that allow for firm heterogeneity across a
number of relevant parameters. In this section we provide some analytical derivations and show
how the theoretical work of Vasicek’s can be generalized. An empirical evaluation of the importance
of allowing for firm heterogeneity in credit risk analysis is discussed in Section 9.
Under the heterogeneous multifactor return process, (14), the portfolio loss, cN,t+1, can be
written as
cN,t+1 =
NX
i=1
witI
¡
ai − δ0ift+1 − εi,t+1
¢
, (37)
where, as before δi = γi/σi are the standardized factor loadings, and ai = (λi−µi)/σi. In addition
to allowing for parameter heterogeneity, we also relax the assumption that the common factors,
ft+1, and the idiosyncratic shocks, εi,t+1, are normally distributed. Accordingly we assume that
εi,t+1 | It ∼ iid (0, 1), for all i and t,
ft+1 | It ∼ iid (µt, Im), for all t,
where under the dynamic factor model, (25), µt = Λft. Allowing µt to be time-varying enables us
to explicitly consider the possible eﬀects of business cycle variations on the loss distribution. In the
credit risk literature µt is usually set to zero.
21 For future use we shall denote the It-conditional
probability density and the cumulative distribution functions of εi,t+1 and ft+1, by fε(·) and Fε(·),
and ff (·) and Ff (·), respectively.
To deal with parameter heterogeneity across firms we adopt the random coeﬃcient model22
θi = θ + vi, vi v iid (0,Ωvv), for i = 1, 2, ..., N, (38)
where
θi =
¡
ai, δ0i
¢0 , θ = ¡a, δ0¢0 , vi = ¡via,v0iδ¢0 , (39)
and
Ωvv =
Ã
ωaa ωaδ
ωδa Ωδδ
!
, (40)
is a semi-positive definite symmetric matrix, and v0is are distributed independently of (εjt, ft) for
all i, j and t. Allowing for such parameter heterogeneity may be desirable when firms have diﬀerent
sensitivities to the systematic risk factors ft+1, and those sensitivities or factor loadings are known
21With the possible exception of Wilson (1997a,b).
22Using (19), also note that
ai =
λi − µi
σi
=
s
1 + δ0iδi

Φ−1 (πˆR)

, if i ∈ R.
But, to simplify the exposition we do not take account of the explicit dependence of ai on δi.
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only up to their distributional properties described in (38). A practical example might be assessing
the credit risk for a portfolio of borrowers which are privately held, i.e. not publicly traded. This
is typically the case for much of middle market and most of small business lending. For such firms
it would be very diﬃcult to obtain estimates of θi, in which case θ may need to be substituted for
all borrowers i.
5.6 Limits to Unexpected Loss under Parameter Heterogeneity
The extent to which credit losses are diversifiable can be measured by V ar (cN,t+1 | It), and can be
obtained noting that in general
V ar (cN,t+1 | It) = Ef [V ar (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It)] + V arf [E (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It)] . (41)
Because of the dependence of the default indicators, zi,t+1, across i, through the common factors
ft+1, unexpected loss remains even with a portfolio of infinitely many exposures. The problem
of correlated defaults can be dealt with by first conditioning the analysis on the source of cross-
dependence (namely ft+1) and noting that conditional on ft+1 the default indicators, zi,t+1 =
I
¡
ai − δ0ift+1 − εi,t+1
¢
, i = 1, 2, ...,N , are independently distributed. In particular, we have
E (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It) =
NX
i=1
witE (zi,t+1 | ft+1, It) , (42)
with the unexpected loss given by
V ar (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It) =
NX
i=1
w2itV ar (zi,t+1 | ft+1, It) , (43)
where the expected conditional default probability is
E (zi,t+1 | ft+1, It) = Pr
¡
εi,t+1 ≤ ai − δ0ift+1 | ft+1, It
¢
(44)
=
Z αi−βift+1
−∞
fε(v)dv ≡ Fε
¡
ai − δ0ift+1
¢
,
and the conditional variance is
V ar (zi,t+1 | ft+1, It) = E (zi,t+1 | ft+1, It)− [E (zi,t+1 | ft+1, It)]2
= Fε
¡
ai − δ0ift+1
¢
− F 2ε
¡
ai − δ0ift+1
¢
≤ 1
4
. (45)
To integrate out the eﬀects of the common factors on the variance of cN,t+1, we shall make use of
(41), (43) and (45) and note that
V ar (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It) =
NX
i=1
w2itV ar (zi,t+1 | ft+1, It) ≤
1
4
Ã
NX
i=1
w2it
!
.
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Hence, under (22)
E [V ar (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It)] ≤ 1
4
Ã
NX
i=1
w2it
!
→ 0, as N →∞, (46)
and in the limit the unexpected loss, V ar (cN,t+1 | It) , will be dominated by the second term in
(41). Namely, we have
lim
N→∞
V ar (cN,t+1 | It) = lim
N→∞
{V ar [E (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It)]} , (47)
which is similar to Proposition 2 in Gordy (2003). This result clearly shows that when the portfolio
weights satisfy the granularity condition, (22), the limit behavior of the unexpected loss does not
depend on the weights wit.. Furthermore, this result holds irrespective of whether ai and δi are
homogeneous, or vary across i.
Under the random coeﬃcient model, (38), the variance expression (47) can be obtained by
integrating out the heterogeneous eﬀects of αi and δi. First note that
cN,t+1 =
NX
i=1
witI
¡
ai − δ0ift+1 − εi,t+1
¢
,
which under (38) can be written as
cN,t+1 =
NX
i=1
witI
¡
a− δ0ft+1 − ζi,t+1
¢
, (48)
where
ζi,t+1 = εi,t+1 − v0iht+1 (49)
and ht+1 = (1,−f 0t+1)0. Conditional on ft+1, ζi,t+1 is distributed independently across i with zero
mean and the variance
ω2t+1 = 1 + h
0
t+1Ωvvht+1 (50)
where h0t+1Ωvvht+1 is the variance contribution arising from the random coeﬃcients model (i.e. the
parameter heterogeneity). The expected loss conditional on ft+1 is given by
E (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It) =
NX
i=1
wit Pr
¡
ζi,t+1 ≤ a− δ0ft+1 | ft+1,It
¢
=
NX
i=1
witFκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
,
and since
PN
i=1wi = 1, then
E (cN,t+1 | ft+1,It) = Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
, (51)
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where Fκ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized composite innovation,
namely
κi,t+1 | ft+1,It =
ζi,t+1
ωt+1
∼ iid(0, 1). (52)
Therefore, using (47), we have23
lim
N→∞
V ar (cN,t+1 | It) = V ar
·
Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
| It
¸
, (53)
which does not depend on the exposure weights, wit. This result represents a generalization of the
limit variance obtained for the homogeneous case, given by (33).
As in the homogeneous case, it is also clear that the limit of V ar (cN,t+1 | It) as N → ∞
vanishes if and only if ft+1 conditional on It is non-stochastic. Restated, allowing the portfolio to
grow without bound, i.e. N →∞, eliminates idiosyncratic but not systematic risk. In general, when
the returns are cross-sectionally correlated, full diversification is not possible and cN,t+1 converges
to a random variable with a non-degenerate probability distribution.
The implication for credit risk management is clear: changing the exposure weights that satisfy
(22) will have no risk diversification impact so long as all firms in the portfolio have the same risk
factor loading distribution. To achieve systematic diversification one needs diﬀerent firm types, e.g.
along industry lines, and we treat this in Section 8 below.
6 Limit Behavior of Credit Loss Distribution
6.1 Homogeneous Case with Non-Gaussian Innovations
In order to show how our approach relates to that of Vasicek, we first consider the homogeneous
parameter case but do not require ft+1 and εi,t+1 to have Gaussian distributions. Since in the
homogeneous case the multifactor model is equivalent to a single factor model, we consider scalar
values for δi and ft+1 and denote them by δ and ft+1, respectively. In this case we note that
conditional on ft+1, the random variables zi,t+1 are identically and independently distributed as
well as being integrable. (Recall that |wizi,t+1| ≤ 1 for all i and t.) Hence, conditional on ft+1 and
as N →∞, we have
cN,t+1 | ft+1, It a.s.→ Fε (a− δft+1) .
In the limit the probability density function of cN,t+1 | It can be obtained from the probability
density functions of ft+1 and εi,t+1, which we denote here by ff (·) and fε(·), respectively. It will
be helpful to write the loss density fc(·) in terms of the systematic risk factor density ff (·) and the
standardized idiosyncratic shock density fε(·).
23Numerical values of limN→∞ V ar (cN,t+1 | It) can be obtained by stochastic simulations, for a given distribution
of κi,t+1.
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Therefore, conditional on It and denoting the limit of cN,t+1 as N →∞, by ct+1 we have (with
probability 1)
ct+1 = Fε (a− δft+1) . (54)
Now making use of standard results on transformation of probability densities, for δ 6= 0 we have
fc (ct+1 | It) =
¯¯¯¯
∂Fε (a− δft+1)
∂ft+1
¯¯¯¯−1
ff (ft+1 | It) ,
where ft+1 is given in terms of ct+1, via (54), namely
ft+1 =
a− F−1ε (ct+1)
δ
,
and |∂Fε (a− δft+1) /∂ft+1| is the Jacobian of the transformation which is given by
∂Fε (a− δft+1)
∂ft+1
= −δfε (a− δft+1) = −δfε
£
F−1ε (ct+1)
¤
.
Hence
fc (ct+1 | It) =
ff
³
a−F−1ε (c,t+1)
δ | It
´
|δ| fε
£
F−1ε (ct+1)
¤ , for 0 < ct+1 ≤ 1. (55)
6.1.1 Relation to Vasicek’s Loss Distribution
The above results provide a simple generalization of Vasicek’s one-factor loss density distribution
given by (34), and reduces to it when µt = 0, and assuming that the innovations, ft+1 and εi,t+1
are both Gaussian. In this case
ff (ft+1 | It) = φ (ft+1) ,
fε (εi,t+1 | It) = φ (εi,t+1) , Fε (·) = Φ (·) ,
and
fc (x | It) = 1|δ|



φ
h
a−Φ−1(x)
δ
i
φ [Φ−1(x)]


 , for 0 < x ≤ 1, |δ| 6= 0 (56)
where we have used x for ct+1. Furthermore, in the homogeneous case
δ =
r
ρ
1− ρ, for ρ > 0, (57)
and
π = Φ
Ã
ap
1 + δ2
!
. (58)
Hence
a =
Φ−1(π)√
1− ρ . (59)
Using (57) and (59) in (56) now yields Vasicek’s loss density given by (34) (note that φ(x) = φ(−x)).
20
Under the double-Gaussian assumption, the distribution of δft+1 + εt+1 (conditional on It ) is
also Gaussian and we have (with µt 6= 0)
E (cN,t+1 | It) = Φ
Ã
a− δµtp
1 + δ2
!
.
Using (59) and (57) the conditional mean loss can therefore be written as
E (cN,t+1 | It) = Φ
£
Φ−1 (π)−√ρµt
¤
, (60)
and reduces to π only when µt = 0. It is also interesting to note that under µt 6= 0, Vasicek’s loss
density and distributions become
fc (x | It) =
r
1− ρ
ρ



φ
hq
1−ρ
ρ Φ−1(x)−
q
1
ρΦ−1(π) + µt
i
φ [Φ−1(x)]



, for 0 < x ≤ 1, ρ > 0. (61)
For ρ > 0, the cumulative distribution function associated with this density is given by
Fc (x | It) = Φ
µr
1− ρ
ρ
Φ−1(x)−
r
1
ρ
Φ−1 (π) + µt
¶
. (62)
Also
∂Fc (x | It)
∂µt
= φ
µr
1− ρ
ρ
Φ−1(x)−
r
1
ρ
Φ−1 (π) + µt
¶
> 0,
which shows that good news (a rise in µt) increases the probability of loss falling below a given
threshold, or equivalently reduces the probability of losses above a given thresholds, as to be
expected.
6.1.2 Non-Gaussian Innovations
It is interesting to note that Vasicek and others in this literature first derive the loss distribution
function and then obtain the density - whilst we obtain the density first and then integrate to
obtain the distribution function. One of the advantages of our procedure (aside from lending itself
readily to heterogeneous generalizations) is that it can be used to derive analytic loss densities for
non-Gaussian idiosyncratic shocks as well as non-Gaussian conditional distributions of ft+1. For
example, in the case where idiosyncratic shocks are Gaussian but the conditional distribution of
the common factor is t distributed with v degrees of freedom, we have
fc (x | It) =
tv
³q
v
v−2
h
a−Φ−1(x)
δ − µt
i´
|δ|φ [Φ−1(x)] , for 0 < x ≤ 1, |δ| 6= 0, v > 2,
where
tv (u) =
1√
vB(v/2, 1/2)
£
1 + v−1u2
¤−(v+1)/2
,
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and B(v/2, 1/2) is the beta function.24
Using (55), other loss distributions can also be generated for diﬀerent choices of the probability
densities of ft+1 and εi,t+1, although they might not be analytically tractable. In such cases the
loss distribution can be generated by stochastic simulations.
6.2 Loss Densities under Heterogeneous Parameters
In this section we examine the loss behavior when under firm parameter heterogeneity, introduced
in Section 5.5. In this case, cN,t+1, is given by (48): cN,t+1 =
PN
i=1wiI
¡
a− δ0ft+1 − ζi,t+1
¢
. Since
conditional on ft+1, the composite errors, ζi,t+1 = εi,t+1−via+v0iδft+1, are independently distributed
across i, then
cN,t+1 | ft+1, It a.s.→ Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
,
where as before Fκ (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standardized composite
errors, κi,t+1, defined by (52), ht+1 =
¡
1,−f 0t+1
¢0 and ωt+1 is given by (50). Once again the limiting
distribution of credit loss depends on the conditional densities of ζi,t+1 and ft+1. For example, if
(εi,t+1, via,v0iδ) follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution, then κi,t+1 | ft+1, It ∼ iidN(0, 1).
The probability density of the fraction of the portfolio lost, x, over the range (0,1), can be
derived from the (conditional) joint probability density function assumed for the factors, f , by
application of standard change-of-variable techniques to the non-linear transformation
x = Fκ
Ã
a− δ0fp
1 + ωaa − 2ω0αδf + f 0Ωδδf
!
. (63)
For a generalm factor set up analytical derivations are quite complicated and will not be attempted
here. Instead, we consider the relatively simple case of a single factor model, where f is a scalar,
f . Suppose f = ψ(x) satisfies the transformation, (63), and note that
fc (x | It) =
¯¯
ψ0(x)
¯¯
ff [ψ(x)− µt] , for 0 < x ≤ 1,
where ¯¯
ψ0(x)
¯¯
=
1
|x0(f)| .
In other words, ψ(x) is that value of the systematic factor f which generated loss of x. In the
double-Gaussian case, for example, we have
x0(f) =
Ã
f (δωaδ − aωδδ) + aωaδ − δ (1 + ωaa)
(1 + ωaa − 2ωaδf + ωδδf2)3/2
!
×φ
Ã
a− δfp
1 + ωaa − 2ωaδf + ωδδf2
!
.
24We verified that this loss density (and its cdf, computed numerically using quadrature methods) generates very
similar values for the Gaussian in (56) for v = 30, and is nearly indistinguishable for v = 60.
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Hence ¯¯
ψ0(x)
¯¯
=
µ
1
φ [Φ−1(x)]
¶ ¯¯¯¯
¯
£
1 + ωaa − 2ωaδψ(x) + ωδδψ2(x)
¤3/2
ψ(x) (δωaδ − aωδδ) + aωaδ − δ (1 + ωaa)
¯¯¯¯
¯ .
and for 0 < x ≤ 1 we have
fc (x | It) =
¯¯¯¯
¯
£
1 + ωaa − 2ωaδψ(x) + ωδδψ2(x)
¤3/2
ψ(x) (δωaδ − aωδδ) + aωaδ − δ (1 + ωaa)
¯¯¯¯
¯
½
φ [ψ(x)− µt]
φ [Φ−1(x)]
¾
. (64)
This generalizes the result obtained for the homogeneous case, (56), and reduces to it if we
set ωaa = ωaδ = ωδδ = 0. It is also interesting to note that the above limiting loss distribution
does not depend on the individual values of the portfolio weights, wi, i = 1, 2, ..., N , so long as the
granularity conditions in (22) are satisfied.
6.3 Implications of Parameter Heterogeneity for the Loss Distribution
As the above results clearly show, parameter heterogeneity can significantly aﬀect the expected and
unexpected losses, as well as the whole shape of the loss distribution. An analysis of the eﬀects of
heterogeneity on loss distribution in the general case, however, is analytically complicated and is
best carried out via stochastic simulations, an approach that we shall consider in Section 9 below.
But useful insights can be gained by limiting the analysis to the eﬀects of heterogeneity of the mean
returns and/or default thresholds across firms, assuming the factor loadings and the error variances
are the same across firms. In this case, using (37) and assuming γi = γ and σi = σ, we have
cN,t+1 = I (ai − δ ft+1 − εi,t+1) ,
where δ = γ/σ, and ai = (λi − µi)/σ. This set-up is suﬃciently general to allow for possible
heterogeneity in the mean returns, µi, and/or default thresholds, λi. Suppose that ai follows the
random coeﬃcient model
ai = a+ vi, vi ∼ iid N(0, σ2v). (65)
It is then easily seen that
E (cN,t+1) = π =
NX
i=1
wit Pr (δ ft+1 + εi,t+1 − vi ≤ a) = Φ

 aq
1 + δ2 + σ2v

 , (66)
and
lim
N→∞
[V ar (cN,t+1) | It] = V arf
"
Φ
Ã
a− δ ft+1p
1 + σ2v
!
| It
#
. (67)
These results clearly show that both expected and unexpected losses are aﬀected by mean re-
turn/threshold heterogeneity. In this relatively simple example the degree of heterogeneity is un-
ambiguously measured by the size of σ2v and it is easily seen that,
∂π
∂σ2v
= φ

 aq
1 + δ2 + σ2v

 − a/2¡
1 + δ2 + σ2v
¢3/2
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is positive since in practice one would expect a < 0. Notice that the distance to default is
aq
1 + δ2 + σ2v
= Φ−1 (π) , (68)
and for values of π relevant in credit risk management, Φ−1 (π) < 0. Therefore, for typical values
of π, the eﬀect of heterogeneity would be to increase expected losses. The dependence of π on σ2v is
monotonic, and the higher the degree of heterogeneity the larger will be π. This result also shows
that neglecting heterogeneity in credit risk analysis can lead to under-estimation of mean losses
and can have hard to predict consequences on higher moments, and in particular the tails of the
loss distribution.
To examine the eﬀect of heterogeneity on unexpected losses, we first control for the eﬀect of
changes in σ2v on expected losses by setting a =
q
1 + δ2 + σ2v Φ−1 (π). From (66) it is clear that
this choice of a ensures that E (cN,t+1) = π, irrespective of the value of σ2v. Using (67) it now
follows that
lim
N→∞
[V ar (cN,t+1) | It] = V arf
h
Φ
³
Φ−1 (π)
p
1 + κ2 − κft+1
´
| It
i
.
where
κ =
δp
1 + σ2v
.
Also, the pair-wise correlation coeﬃcient, ρij , in this case is given by
ρij = ρ =
δ2
1 + δ2 + σ2v
=
κ2
1 + κ2
, (69)
and as in the homogeneous case is the same across all i and j. Hence, noting that κ2 = ρ/(1− ρ),
we have
lim
N→∞
[V ar (cN,t+1) | It] = V arf
·
Φ
µ
Φ−1 (π)√
1− ρ −
r
ρ
1− ρft+1
¶
| It
¸
.
Therefore, under E (cN,t+1) = π, in the limit as N →∞ the unexpected loss depends on the degree
of parameter heterogeneity, σ2v, only through the return correlation coeﬃcient, ρ. From (69) note
that for a given value of δ (the standardized threshold), ρ is a decreasing function of σ2v. A rise in
heterogeneity (or σ2v) reduces ρ, which in turn results in a reduction of unexpected losses. So, once
expected losses are appropriately corrected to take account of the increased risk of dealing with a
heterogeneous sample, that very heterogeneity can be exploited to achieve greater diversification of
the credit risk portfolio. Indeed as we shall see in Section 9.4, simulation reveals that once expected
losses are controlled for, ignoring parameter heterogeneity results in significant overestimation of
credit risk, especially in the tails.
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7 Allowing for Correlated Loss Severity
Consider now the more general case where the loss function is given by (23) and assume that LGD
variables, ϕi,t+1, depend on the common factors ft+1 but conditional on ft+1,
25 ϕi,t+1 and zi,t+1 are
independently distributed.26 A common formulation for LGD is the Beta distribution, convenient
because it is bounded between 0 and 1, with two shape parameters that can be expressed in terms
of the average and volatility of observed LGDs. Specifically, suppose that
fϕ
¡
ϕi,t+1 | ft+1, It
¢
∼ Beta(pt+1, qt+1),
where Beta(pt+1, qt+1) is a Beta distribution with parameters p and q that depend on ft+1, and
possibly on It. Note also that
E
¡
ϕi,t+1 | ft+1, It
¢
=
pt+1
pt+1 + qt+1
.
We shall consider the following logistic form as an example of this mean function
E
¡
ϕi,t+1 | ft+1,It
¢
=
eκ
0ft+1
1 + eκ0ft+1
,
where κ measures the degree to which mean LGD varies with the business cycle indicators, here
represented by ft+1. Clearly other functional forms and business cycle indicators can also be used.
Note that LGD is assumed not to vary systematically across exposures i but only over t.27
Since
¯¯
ϕi,t+1zi,t+1
¯¯
≤ 1, firstly the results (46) and (47) continue to hold. Also under the random
coeﬃcient model (38) we have
E (cN,t+1 | ft+1, It) =
Ã
eκ
0ft+1
1 + eκ0ft+1
!
Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
,
and hence
lim
N→∞
V ar (cN,t+1 | It) = V ar
"Ã
eκ
0ft+1
1 + eκ0ft+1
!
Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
| It
#
.
Finally, the limit distribution in this case can also be derived noting that
cN,t+1 | ft+1, It a.s.→
Ã
eκ
0ft+1
1 + eκ0ft+1
!
Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
.
25For empirical evidence of procyclical LGD, see Frye (2000), Altman et al. (2003) and Hu and Perraudin (2002).
26This does not seem to be a restrictive assumption.
27This formulation ties the two random variables of interest, default and LGD, to the same systematic risk factor(s)
while allowing the factor loadings to be diﬀerent. Again, the basic idea is that credit risk correlations/dependence,
diﬃcult if not impossible to observe directly, are modeled indirectly through the systematic factors. This is both
conceptually desirable because we are using a structural model, as well as pragmatically and empirically useful since
we focus the modeling eﬀort where the data is dense and not sparse.
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8 Possible Sectoral or Geographic Diversification
The results obtained so far provides the limits to risk diversification through inclusion of additional
firms with diﬀerent idiosyncratic characteristics. For the homogeneous case there is a lower bound
to the unexpected loss given by
V ar [Fε (a− δft+1) | It] ,
and for the heterogeneous case by
V ar
·
Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶
| It
¸
.
In both cases as N →∞, unexpected losses do not depend on the exposure weights, wi. Further-
more, if ft+1 are serially independent (as is often assumed in the finance literature), then the above
bounds hold unconditionally, namely the lower bound to risk diversification is given by
V ar (cN,t+1) > V ar
·
Fκ
µ
θ0ht+1
ωt+1
¶¸
.
Once idiosyncratic risk vanishes, there is no scope for active diversification through changes in the
portfolio weights so long as N is suﬃciently large and wi satisfy the atomistic conditions, (22).
There might, however, be important possibilities for further diversification if we could group the
firms into diﬀerent categories with the parameters of each category having diﬀerent distributions.
One may think of these categories as diﬀerent industries, sectors, or countries, for instance, whose
sensitivities to the systematic risk factor are stochastic. As a simple example suppose there are
N = NA +NB firms grouped into country A (say Japan) and country B (say U.S.) such that
A : rAi,t+1 = µAi + γ0Aift+1 + σAiεAi,t+1, i = 1, 2, ..., NA
B : rBi,t+1 = µBi + γ0Bift+1 + σBiεBi,t+1, i = 1, 2, ..., NB,
where
µAi = µA + vAµi, µBi = µB + vBµi,
γAi = γA + vAγi, γBi = γB + vBγi.
Thus, for example, fixed eﬀects for Japanese firms (A) are randomly distributed around a country
mean, µA, and the Japanese systematic factor loading is also randomly distributed around a country
eﬀect, γA. Suppose further that those errors
³
vAµi,v0Aγi
´0
and
³
vBµi,v0Bγi
´0
are independently
distributed: Ã
vAµi
vAγi
!
∼ iid
¡
0,ΩAvv
¢
,
Ã
vBµi
vBγi
!
∼ iid
¡
0,ΩBvv
¢
.
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Therefore cross-country or -sector dependence arises only through ft+1 and not through the para-
meter distributions themselves, although it is now possible that diﬀerent factors could aﬀect the
firm returns in diﬀerent countries or sectors.
Consider now the following credit portfolio composed of two separate portfolios each with
weights 't and (1−'t):
c(A,B)N,t+1 = 't
NAX
i=1
wiAI (λiA − riA,t+1) + (1−'t)
NBX
i=1
wiBI (λiB − riB,t+1) ,
where
NAX
i=1
wiA =
NBX
i=1
wiB = 1,
NAX
i=1
w2iA → 0,
NBX
i=1
w2iB → 0, as NA and NA →∞,
meaning the two sub-portfolios have a large number of relatively small exposures. We may compare
the “joint” portfolio to the following “single-country” portfolios
c(A)NA,t+1 =
NAX
i=1
wiAI (λiA − riA,t+1) ,
or
c(B)NB ,t+1 =
NBX
i=1
wiBI (λiB − riB,t+1) .
It is now easily seen that the limit of the unexpected losses associated with these portfolios as
NA, NB →∞, are given by
lim
NA→∞
V ar
h
c(A)NA,t+1 | It
i
= V ar
·
Fκ
µ
θ0Aht+1
ωA,t+1
¶
| It
¸
= VtA, (70)
lim
NB→∞
V ar
h
c(B)NB ,t+1 | It
i
= V ar
·
Fκ
µ
θ0Bht+1
ωB,t+1
¶
| It
¸
= VtB,
lim
NA,NB→∞
V ar
h
c(A,B)N,t+1 | It
i
= '2tVtA + (1−'t)2VtB,
where θA = (aA, δ0A)0, θB = (aB, δ0B)0, and ω2s,t+1 = 1 + h0t+1Ωsvvht+1, for s = A,B. Hence, the
unexpected losses of the combined portfolio will be minimized with
'∗t =
VtB
VtA + VtB
.
Note that both NA and NB individually need to be suﬃciently large for idiosyncratic risk to vanish.
Not surprisingly it is optimal to place a larger weight on the portfolio with a smaller unexpected
loss conditional on It. Using '∗t we have
lim
N→∞
V ar
h
c(A,B)N,t+1 | It
i
=
VtAVtB
VtA + VtB
,
which is smaller than either VtA or VtB. Therefore, the joint sectorally or geographically diversified
portfolio will be less risky than either of the standalone portfolios A or B.
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9 An Empirical Application: Heterogeneity and Risk Diversifica-
tion
In this section we consider diﬀerent types of heterogeneity across firms and illustrate their eﬀects
on the resulting loss distribution by simulating losses for credit portfolios comprised of public firms
from the U.S. and Japan. We form these credit portfolios at the end of each year from 1997 to
2002 and then simulate portfolio losses for the following year. All of the simulation parameters are
estimated recursively using 10-year (40-quarter) rolling windows. The simulations are out-of-sample
in that the models, fitted over a ten-year sample, are used to simulate losses for the subsequent 11th
year. This recursive procedure allows us to explore the time variation in the underlying parameters
as well as the eﬀects that such time variations might have on loss distributions.
9.1 Data and Portfolio Construction
The loss simulations require an estimate of the unconditional probability of default for each firm.
These may be obtained at the level of the credit rating, R, assigned to the firm by rating agencies
such as Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. Rating agencies eﬀectively group firms into credit ratings such
as AAA, BB, etc., by credit quality. In assessing the credit quality of a firm, a rating agency
has access to, and presumably makes use of, information about a firm not necessarily available to
outsiders. Given credit rating histories, one is able to compute default probabilities by rating, and
with suﬃcient data, it is in principle possible to allow for more granularity and obtain estimates
of π by country and industry, by rating, but at present the available data do not allow for this.
We estimate probabilities of default recursively for each grade using 10-year rolling windows of
all firm rating histories from S&P. These probabilities are estimated using the time-homogeneous
Markov or parametric duration estimator discussed in Lando and Skødeberg (2002) and Jafry and
Schuermann (2004). We impose a minimum annual probability of default (PD) of 0.001% or 0.1
basis points. Our estimated PDs for both AAA and AA fall below this minimum for all six cohorts.
Credit ratings have an additional advantage in a multi-country context. They are designed to
be directly comparable across countries, meaning that a AA in Japan is comparable to a AA in
the U.S., thus controlling for heterogeneity in accounting standards and bankruptcy conventions
across countries.
In order to be selected for inclusion in our portfolios, a firm needs a credit rating as well as 10
years of consecutive quarterly equity returns that match the rolling estimation window. The first
estimation sample covers the ten years ending in December 31, 1997, the second ten-year period
ends in December 31, 1998, and so on with the last estimation sample ending in December 31,
2002, providing us with six yearly recursive forecasts for the years 1998 to 2003, inclusive. For
these recursions to be operational the initial portfolio requires firms to have a credit rating from
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either Moody’s or S&P at year-end 1997 as well as 40 consecutive quarters of equity returns, from
1988Q1 to 1997Q4. In case both ratings are available the S&P rating is chosen.28 For the first
sample or cohort (which ends in 1997) we have 211 Japanese firms and 628 U.S. firms; a portfolio
of 839 firms in total. At the end of the following year the portfolio is rebalanced retaining surviving
firms and augmented with additional new firms that have a rating at the end of that year, i.e. 1998,
and also have 40 consecutive quarters of returns.29 All returns are computed in U.S. dollar (USD).
For Japanese firms this is done by subtracting the rate of change of yen/USD exchange rate from
their yen-denominated returns.
To make the portfolio exposures representative of the rated universe in each country, we re-
weight the portfolio exposures (in USD) by rating in the following manner. Suppose that each
obligor begins with $100 of exposure. If 10% of all rated Japanese firms have a BB rating, but
15.6% of the Japanese firms in our portfolio are BB-rated, then each of these firms will be given
$63 (10.015.6 · $100) of exposure. In the U.S. the diﬀerence in the ratings distribution across the two
agencies is modest, but not so in Japan where Moody’s rates more than twice as many firms as
S&P. To address this issue we take the average of the two agencies’ ratings distributions by rating
for each country.30
The portfolio composition is adjusted annually starting with 1998 to reflect defaults, upgrades
and downgrades which may have occurred during the year. Since migration matrices even at
annual frequencies are diagonally dominant, with average staying probabilities exceeding 90% for
investment grades, annual portfolio rebalancing seems a reasonable compromise between accuracy
and computational burden; the alternative would be quarterly rebalancing. We also update the
ratings distribution each year to allow for compositional changes in the universe of rated firms. For
example, at the end of 1997 B-rated firms made up only 1.54% of all rated Japanese firms, but by
year-end 2002 this proportion had risen to 6.75%. Below in Table 1 we show the average ratings
distribution for each country for 1997 and 2002. It becomes clear that there has been a systematic
deterioration in average credit quality over this period. In addition, estimated probabilities of
default for non-investment grade ratings, and for CCC in particular, have risen noticeably over this
period. As a result, the weighted average annual probability of default, πˆ, has increased from 1.23%
for the year-end 1997 portfolio to 3.26% for the year-end 2002 portfolio.
28The decision rule is driven by the use of S&P ratings histories to compute the default probabilities πR.
29Our source of return data for U.S. firms is CRSP while for Japanese firms it is Datastream.
30The precise exposure allocation is as follows. Denote FVic to be the (face value) exposure to firm i in country c.
The portfolio total nominal face value is $1bn. Then
FVic = $1bn · wc ·

1
Nc

· θ(R)c for i ∈ R,
where wc is the share of the total portfolio for country c (75% for the U.S., 25% for Japan), Nc is the number of
firms in country c, θ(R)c is the rating representation adjustment. Note that θ(R)c will vary across time to reflect
compositional changes in the rated universe of firms in county c.
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Table 1: Ratings Distributions and Probabilities of Default
1997 2002
Ratings Distribution (%) Ratings Distribution (%)
Credit Rating Japan U.S. Both πˆR(%) Japan U.S. Both πˆR(%)
AAA 4.80 2.86 3.35 0.001 0.75 2.37 1.97 0.001
AA 22.62 10.81 13.76 0.001 16.03 9.25 10.95 0.001
A 37.93 25.61 28.69 0.005 29.38 21.49 23.46 0.006
BBB 23.16 22.33 22.54 0.064 34.89 25.67 27.97 0.106
BB 9.94 16.30 14.71 0.481 11.85 15.72 14.75 0.630
B 1.54 19.79 15.22 3.343 6.75 19.62 16.40 5.429
CCC 0.00 2.31 1.73 36.49 0.35 5.89 4.50 49.78
Portfolio πˆ 1.23 3.26
Using two-digit SIC codes we group firms into seven broad sectors to ensure a suﬃcient number
of firms per sector. The sectors and percentage of firms by sector by country at year-end 1997 are
summarized below in Table 2.
Table 2: Industry Breakdowns by Country
(Percent of observations) at year-end 1997
U.S. Japan
Agriculture, Mining & Construction 5.3 8.5
Communication, Electric & Gas 16.7 6.2
Durable Manufacturing 22.1 34.1
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 23.1 14.7
Non-durable Manufacturing 18.2 24.6
Service 4.8 6.6
Wholesale & Retail Trade 9.9 5.2
Total 100 100
9.2 Model Specifications
To explore the role of geographic and sectoral heterogeneity we introduce two new indices into the
notation of the previous sections. Specifically, denote rijc,t+1 to be the return of firm i in sector
j in country c over the quarter t to t + 1, where i = 1, ..., Ijc, j = 1, ..., Ic, c = 1, ..., C. The
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application will explore C = 2 countries (Japan and U.S.) and Ic = 7 sectors/industries in each
country. Following (14), and relaxing the assumption that ft+1 ∼ (0, Im), made for expositional
simplicity, the return equations relevant to our empirical applications can be written as
rijc,t+1 = αijc + β0ijcft+1 + uijc,t+1, (71)
where ft+1 ∼
¡
µf ,Σf
¢
, µf is an m× 1 vector of constants, and Σf is the covariance matrix of the
common factors, also assumed fixed. In terms of the return parameters of (3) and (14) we have
µijc,t+1 = αijc + β
0
ijcµf , (72)
and
ξijc,t+1 = β
0
ijc(ft+1 − µf ) + uijc,t+1. (73)
Note also that
σ2ξ
ijc
= β0ijcΣfβijc + σ2ijc , (74)
where σ2ijc is the variance of the idiosyncratic component, uijc,t+1.
Following a standard approach in the finance literature, we model firm returns using an unob-
served components or factor approach, either single or multiple, with increasing degrees of hetero-
geneity.31 One obvious source of heterogeneity is geography or country. As we have two countries,
we estimate each model specification first by pooling the U.S. and Japanese firms (referred to as the
“pooled model” specification) and then by estimating a separate model by country (the “modeled
separately” specification).
The empirical exercise involves a number of variations on the basic firm return equation given
by (71) using market-cap weighted market returns for each country r¯c,t+1 as proxies for two of the
possible m common factors. Sector returns for a country c, r¯jc,t+1, j = 1, ..., Ic, are computed in
a similar fashion, namely using the market-cap weighted average of firm returns in that sector.32
The “global” market return index, r¯t+1, is made up of just the two countries U.S. and Japan and
is simply the weighted sum of the two individual country returns,
r¯t+1 = wUS r¯US,t+1 + (1−wUS)r¯JP,t+1, (75)
where wUS measures the relative size of the U.S. economy. We estimate wUS by taking the average
U.S. share of PPP-denominated GDP over 1997-2002, and obtain wUS = 0.75. To obtain the global
sector return r¯j,t+1 for a particular sector j we proceed similarly to (75) and define
r¯j,t+1 = wUS r¯j,t+1,US + (1− wUS)r¯j,t+1,JP . (76)
31An application where the firm returns are linked to observable macroeconomic factors using a global VAR model
is provided in PSTW.
32The weights for period t+ 1 are based on the average of the market capitalization (in USD) at end of periods t
and t+ 1.
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The simplest model is the return specification assumed under the Vasicek model,
rijc,t+1 = αc + βcr¯c,t+1 + uijc,t+1, (77)
with homogeneous error variances, uijc,t+1 ∼ iidN(0, σ2c). For the pooled model, σ2c = σ2, αc = α,
βc = β and r¯c,t+1 = r¯t+1 as in (75) for c = US and JP .
Next is the fixed eﬀect model where we allow αijc to vary across firms i in each sector j and
country c. We examine two versions of the fixed eﬀects model, one holding the error variances fixed
across all firms (σ2c) and the other allowing each firm to have its own error variance (σ
2
ijc). When
we hold the error variances fixed across all firms, the slope coeﬃcient is unchanged from the one
obtained under (77). When we allow each firm to have its own error variance, the slope coeﬃcient
is always less than the estimate obtained under (77).
The third model specification allows for full parameter heterogeneity where fixed eﬀects, slopes
and error variances are allowed to vary across firms. Here too we estimate two versions, where in
the second we add an industry or sector factor so that each firm’s returns is regressed on r¯c,t+1 as
well as on r¯cj,t+1. To be clear, for the pooled model, r¯c,t+1 = r¯t+1 as in (75), and r¯cj,t+1 = r¯j,t+1 as
in (76), for c = US and JP .
The fourth and final model specification is the principal components (PCA) model. See Ap-
pendix A for further detailed account of this specification. Using the procedure outlined in Bai
and Ng (2002), we extract mˆ relevant principal components which capture most of the in-sample
variation in firm returns. In the application, the procedure resulted in two factors for the U.S.,
three for Japan and three for the pooled model (i.e. when firm returns from the U.S. and Japan
are pooled). The procedure was conducted for the 1997 cohort of firms, using the prior ten years of
quarterly data. For tractability the number of factors was kept fixed for the subsequent cohort of
firms, though the actual factors were, of course, re-estimated. Table 3 summarizes all eight model
specifications that we consider.
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Table 3: Specifications of Return Equations and Default Thresholds
for Separate Country Models, c = US, JP
Models Descriptions Returns Default Thresholds
I Vasicek rijc,t+1 = αc + βcr¯c,t+1 + uijc,t+1 λc/DDc
II(a) Fixed Eﬀects (σ2) rijc,t+1 = αijc + βcr¯c,t+1 + uijc,t+1 λc/DDc,i
II(b) Fixed Eﬀects (σ2i ) rijc,t+1 = αijc + βcr¯c,t+1 + uijc,t+1 λc/DDc,i
II(c) Rating (σ2) rijc,t+1 = αc + βcr¯c,t+1 + uijc,t+1 λi/DDR
II(d) Fixed Eﬀects (σ2i ) rijc,t+1 = αijc + βcr¯c,t+1 + uijc,t+1 λi/DDR
III(a) CAPM rijc,t+1 = αijc + βijcr¯c,t+1 + uijc,t+1 λi/DDR
III(b) Sector/CAPM rijc,t+1 = αijc + β1,ijcr¯c,t+1 λi/DDR
+β2,ijcr¯cj,t+1 + uijc,t+1
IV PCA rijc,t+1 = αijc + β0ijcfc,t+1 + uijc,t+1 λi/DDR
Note: For the “Pooled” models the c subscript on r¯c,t+1, r¯cj,t+1, fc,t+1, and λc is dropped.
For simulation of loss distributions, in addition to the return equations, we also need to specify
the determination of the default thresholds. The first three models, I, II(a) and II(b), do not make
use of credit rating information at the firm level. The Vasicek model treats all firms identically at the
country level (for the two-country pooled model, all firms are treated identically), and so imposing
within type homogeneity of distance to default is identical to within type homogeneity of default
thresholds. Models II(a) and II(b) use within a given type homogeneity of default thresholds where
firms are typed at the country level, or not at all for the pooled models. The default thresholds for
the remaining models, labeled λi/DDR in the Table 3, use the identifying restriction (9), namely
that the distance to default is the same across all firms of a given rating. An estimate of λi is
obtained using (11) where estimates µi and σ
2
ξ
i
are obtained using (72) and (74), respectively.
We shall also consider simulation results using the alternative identification scheme for the
default thresholds based on (8), which imposes the same threshold for all firms in a given rating.
Further, to allow for direct comparisons, all models are calibrated to have the same expected loss
within a cohort (or sample period).
9.3 Return Regression Results
The return regression parameters, estimated recursively using a 10-year rolling window, are sum-
marized in Table 4. Note that these are all in-sample estimates. We focus our discussion on the
average pair-wise correlation of returns and the average pair-wise correlation of residuals as they
map naturally into our loss modeling framework. The average pair-wise correlation of residuals is
of particular interest since it gives an indication of how close a particular model is to conditional
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independence.
We focus for now on Panel A and shall return to Panels B through F of Table 4 below. The
average pair-wise correlation of quarterly returns for the first ten years, 1988-1997, was 0.1933 for
the U.S. firms in the sample, a much higher 0.6011 for the Japanese firms, and when all firms are
pooled their average pair-wise correlation is very close to the U.S.-only sample at 0.1937, suggesting
that the average pair-wise correlation between U.S. and Japanese firms is relatively low.33
The diﬀerent model specifications are able to control for diﬀerent degrees of cross firm return
correlations. Considering first the U.S. and Japan pooled results, the average pair-wise correlation
of residuals for the whole portfolio is around 0.022 for the Vasicek, fixed eﬀect and single factor
CAPM model. Adding an industry factor reduces that residual correlation to 0.0147, and the PCA
model leaves almost no residual correlation. In-sample goodness of fit across models as measured
by R¯2 (not reported in the table) range from 0.135 for the Vasicek to 0.229 for the sector CAPM
to 0.339 for the PCA model.
Staying with the pooled model, notice the high degree of residual correlation that remains for the
Japanese firms, ranging from around 45% (fixed eﬀect) to 39% (CAPM). The reason is simple: the
“global” market weighted return, r¯t+1, is dominated by U.S. firms. Still, if we examine U.S. firms
only, their average pair-wise correlation of residuals ranges from around 7% (sector CAPM model)
to 9.5% (Vasicek and fixed eﬀects models). The overall portfolio average is so low only because
residuals from U.S. and Japanese firm regressions are uncorrelated or even negatively correlated.
Estimating the models separately for each country helps, and this is seen clearly in the last
three columns of Table 4, Panel A. While the overall average pair-wise correlation of residuals is
quite similar at around 1.5% to 2%, for Japanese firms it is reduced dramatically, from a range
of 39% to 45% under the pooled specification to a range of 2% to 6% when estimated separately.
Similarly for U.S. firms, the average pair-wise correlation is reduced from a range of 7% to 9.5%
in the pooled approach to a range of 2% to 3.5% when estimated separately. Clearly geographic
heterogeneity plays an important role.
The results reported in Table 4 also show the high degree of variability in the coeﬃcient estimates
that exists across firms. This is illustrated by Figure 2 where the empirical densities (smoothed
histograms) of the firm betas based on the one factor or CAPM model (Model III(a)) are displayed
separately for the two countries. Clearly, there are substantial diﬀerences across firms and across
countries. Also, the estimates of the Japanese betas are much more tightly distributed around
their mean than are U.S. betas. We see a similar pattern with the firm alphas. These results are
line with our assumption in Section 8 that the parameters of the return equations across the two
33For 1988-1997, the average pairwise correlation of USD-denominated returns for Japanese firms of 0.6011 is
slightly higher than the average correlation of Yen-denominated returns of 0.5520 due to the common currency
adjustment. However, local currency returns for Japanese firms in our sample are still noticeably more correlated
than those for U.S. firms. This pattern holds for the later periods as well.
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countries can be viewed as draws from two diﬀerent distributions.
Panels B through F in Table 4 show the recursive estimation results using a 10-year rolling
window for the next five ten-year periods. We note that average pair-wise cross-sectional correla-
tions of firm returns remain at around 20% through 1999 (though they show a steady decline for
Japanese firms), but starting with the cohort of 1991-2000 (Panel D), average correlation for the
portfolio drops to 0.1391. By this point Japanese returns have an average pair-wise correlation of
under 50% and approach 40% for the last cohort, 1993-2002. The sudden and substantial market
reversals in the U.S. in March 2000 and the subsequent market declines probably play a strong role
in explaining these results.
Turning now to the diﬀerent models, the basic pattern across models remains unchanged as
we move down the table (and thus forward in time). Figures 3a (U.S.) and 3b (Japan) show the
empirical density plots of firm betas for three time periods: years ending 1997, 2000 and 2002.
We notice for both countries that the distribution of estimated betas has been shifting subtly to
the left. While the dispersion of U.S. betas has not changed much over the course of these rolling
windows, the Japanese distribution appears to be widening. The firm heterogeneity we seek to
explore here is thus exhibiting some time variation as well.
Finally, throughout the analysis we have been assuming time invariant volatilities. While it is
well know that high frequency (daily, weekly) firm returns exhibit volatility clustering, this eﬀect
tends to vanish as the data frequency declines due to temporal aggregation eﬀects. Nonetheless, we
conducted standard diagnostic tests of the ARCH eﬀects on all firm return regressions in the case of
Model III(a). In Table 5 we report the percentage of firm regressions in which the ARCH eﬀects are
significant at the 5% level. Focusing first on the pooled country results, in the case of U.S. firms the
proportion is close to the nominal value for the first three periods. Thereafter, there is increasing
evidence of the ARCH eﬀects, though never more than 10% of the firm regressions. Japanese firm
returns, on the other hand, exhibit stronger ARCH eﬀects as we can reject the hypothesis of no
ARCH eﬀects for around 10% of firm regressions over the six cohorts. The results for the separate
country models are quite similar. Overall, however, the evidence is not suﬃciently overwhelming
to motivate ARCH modeling across all firms, and we do not expect serious biases resulting from
our assumption of time invariant volatilities.
9.4 Impact of Heterogeneity on Credit Losses
With the firm regressions and default thresholds in hand, we are now able to simulate out-of-sample
and compute the resulting loss distributions for the diﬀerent model specifications. Here we provide
a brief account of how the simulations were carried out. A more detailed description can be found
in Appendix B. Firm returns, as specified in (71), are simulated out-of-sample assuming that the
systematic and idiosyncratic components are serially uncorrelated and independently distributed,
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thus imposing the conditional independence. For simplicity we set LGD = 100%. Allowing for
diﬀerent degrees of parameter heterogeneity yields diﬀerent firm returns. For each simulation
experiment we run 200,000 replications.
9.4.1 Comparison to Asymptotic Results for Vasicek Model
We begin by comparing the simulated loss distributions for our finite-sized portfolio to the asymp-
totic portfolio results which are available for the Vasicek model. Of interest are loss volatility or
unexpected loss (UL), given by (32), and various quantile or VaRs. The analytical expressions for
VaRs for this homogeneous model can be found in Vasicek (2002).
Table 6 reports the loss simulation results for the “pooled” version of Model I for each of the
six rolling windows A through F. These results are out-of-sample in that the models, fitted over
a ten-year sample, are used to forecast firm losses for the year immediately after the estimation
period. For example, the first row in Table 6 describes the losses forecast in 1998 using the model
estimated over the sample period 1988-1997. For each year we report the portfolio expected default
rate, πˆ, which is equal to expected loss under our assumption of no loss recovery and the average
portfolio return correlation, ρ, given by the empirical analog of (27):
ρˆ =
βˆ
2
Vˆ (r¯t+1)
βˆ
2
V (r¯t+1) + σˆ2u
, (78)
where βˆ and σˆ2u are computed recursively using Model I. The estimated variance of r¯t+1, Vˆ (r¯t+1),
is computed from the aggregate returns, r¯t+1, using a rolling 10-year observation window. For the
size of the portfolio we report the total number of firms, Nt, and the eﬀective number of equal-sized
exposures, N∗t =
³PNt
i=1w
2
it
´−1
, where wit are the exposure weights. Table 6 also reports the
asymptotic and simulated UL and VaRs, as well as their diﬀerences denoted as “granularity.”
Looking across the first row of Table 6 we see that our two-country portfolio of 839 firms, with
an eﬀective number of 638 equal-sized exposures, is relatively close to an asymptotically diversified
portfolio. Simulated UL is 1.47%, only 7bp above the asymptotic result. Similarly for the three
quantiles we obtain 99.0%, 99.5% and 99.9% VaR, the last corresponds to the loss calibration level
of the New Basel Accord (BCBS, 2004), the simulated loss levels are never far from though always
above their asymptotic counterpart, as is to be expected. For instance, simulated 99.9% VaR is
12.05% of total portfolio notional, just 23bp above the level achievable with an infinitely large
portfolio. Looking down the table, it is clear that the two-country portfolios for later cohorts are
also close to an asymptotically diversified portfolio.
Introduction of credit rating information in the Vasicek model aﬀects the losses through changes
to the default correlation, ρ∗, even though the pair-wise return correlations continue to be the same
across all firms. From (31) and Figure 1 we know that for any given value of return correlation,
ρ, default correlation, ρ∗, is increasing in the unconditional probability of default, π, so long as
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π < 0.5. This can be seen clearly by computing the default correlation by credit rating, ρ∗R, given an
estimate of a rating specific default rate, πˆR, and the same distance to default by rating identifying
restriction, DDR, given by (9). These correlations can be easily computed using (18), repeated
here for convenience:
ρ∗ij =
E (zi,t+1zj,t+1)− πi,t+1πj,t+1p
πi,t+1(1− πi,t+1)
p
πj,t+1(1− πj,t+1)
,
where πi,t+1 = E (zi,t+1) is firm ith default probability over the period t to t+1. Under the double
Gaussian assumption, E (zi,t+1zj,t+1) is simply
E (zi,t+1zj,t+1) = Φ2
£
Φ−1 (πi,t+1) ,Φ−1 (πj,t+1) , ρij
¤
, (79)
where Φ2[·] is the bivariate standard normal CDF, and ρij is the return correlation between firm
i and j assumed fixed at ρ under the Vasicek’s model. In Panel A of Table 7 we report default
correlations by credit rating for 2003 based on estimates using the last rolling sample window,
1993-2002.34 The top two ratings, AAA & AA, are combined because we impose a minimum
unconditional default probability of 0.001% per annum; see also the discussion in Section 9.1.
The strong diﬀerentiation of the default correlation by credit rating, ρˆ∗R, suggests that this
rating is indeed an important characterization of default heterogeneity, even while imposing strict
homogeneity of return correlations. Put diﬀerently, a high default rate for a low credit rating, say
B, is associated with high default correlation, and vice versa. Gordy (2000) reports similar steeply
increasing default probabilities as one descends the credit rating scale.
Default correlations across credit ratings can also be similarly computed, and these are sum-
marized in Panel B of Table 7. The diagonal entries are just the within-rating default correlation
presented in Panel A. As such, the matrix in Panel B should be thought of as a matrix of correla-
tions rather than a correlation matrix. We notice that the pair-wise default correlations between
high-yields firms, i.e. with ratings lower than BBB, can be substantial.
9.4.2 Loss Simulation Results
Although most of our loss simulations to be reported below are calibrated to have the same EL
across all models, we start by examining the impact of a simple source of heterogeneity, namely
firm fixed eﬀects, on expected and unexpected losses. Recall from the theoretical results in Section
6.3 that the introduction of heterogeneity in ai = (λi − µi)/σ, namely for σ2v > 0, 35 resulted in
increased expected and decreased unexpected losses (once EL is controlled for). Empirically one
may introduce this heterogeneity through a firm fixed eﬀect which impacts µi and therefore ai. The
results are displayed in Table 8, where Panel A shows the impact on EL while Panel B controls
for EL to be the same across the two model specifications and shows the impact on UL. For the
34We do not report the results for previous years as they are qualitatively very similar.
35Recall ai = a+ vi, vi ∼ iid N(0, σ2v).
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first cohort, 1998, the simulated EL increases from 1.23% to 1.72%, as predicted by theory. Panel
B shows that UL declines from 1.47% to 1.39%, again as predicted. This pattern holds true for all
six years or cohorts.
Table 9 reports the loss simulation results for each of the six rolling windows. We proceed by
discussing in detail the loss simulations for the first period and then draw comparisons across years.
In addition to the model number and name in Table 9, we provide the EL calibration using the
default threshold λ and distance to default, DD. For example, the basic Vasicek model has the
same threshold λ and the same distance to default, DD, for all firms. For Model II(a) we add fixed
eﬀects with a common firm error variance, which requires DD to be firm specific while keeping λ
fixed across firms.
For each year we report the first four simulated moments of the loss distribution (note that
the first moment or expected loss is the same across all models by construction) as well as three
commonly reported quantiles: 99.0%, 99.5% and 99.9%. We also calculated expected shortfall; the
results are qualitatively no diﬀerent, and so we report here only the VaR results. The first set
of columns is for the pooled specification while the second set is for the country specific models,
analogous to the in-sample regression results in Table 4.
The fully homogeneous model of Vasicek (Model I), generates the most extreme losses and has
the largest unexpected losses. Allowing for firm fixed eﬀects but keeping firm error variances the
same, Model II(a), results in only a small reduction in risk (whilst controlling for expected losses).
UL drops slightly from 1.47% to 1.39%, the resulting loss distribution is somewhat less skewed (2.8
vs. 3.1) and fat-tailed (kurtosis of 16.9 vs. 19.5), and risk as measured by VaR is a bit lower as
well. For instance 99.9% VaR drops from 12.05% of portfolio notional to 11.14%.
Note that a bank complying with an 8% minimum capital requirement would be insolvent at the
99.9% VaR under these two model specifications. To be sure, the assumption of 100% LGD made
here is unrealistic; average empirical LGDs are around half that. A quick glance at the following
rows suggests that allowing for parameter heterogeneity beyond fixed eﬀects, for instance by just
relaxing the error variances to be firm specific, i.e. Model II(b), results in 99.9% VaR losses of
around 5%. Indeed this source of heterogeneity turns out to be quite important. UL is reduced by
about 70%, dropping to 0.80% from 1.39%. The shape of the overall distribution is less extreme as
both skewness and kurtosis decline substantially. Finally, allowing for firm specific error variances
results in 99.9% VaR of 5.11%, less than half of the value obtained for Model II(a), 11.14%.
The above simulations do not make use of firm rating information.36 Models II(c) and II(d)
examine the impact or value of firm credit ratings. Model II(c) simply adds ratings in the form of a
rating-specific default threshold λ and distance to default DD to the Vasicek specification in Model
I. For the pooled model we go from one (two for the country-specific models) to seven (fourteen)
36To be sure, the overall portfolio EL is calibrated using default rates by credit rating, but so far we have not used
this information at a firm level.
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λ0s, along the lines outlined in Section 3. It is clear that ratings capture an important source of
firm heterogeneity, at least as it pertains to credit risk. Comparing Model II(c) to Model I, UL
drops by about one-third from 1.47% to 1.07% while 99.9% VaR is reduced by nearly 80% from
12.05% to 6.72%. Credit ratings seem to capture relevant firm-specific information, and this is
useful even though the information is grouped together into just a few (seven) rating categories. It
is no accident that credit ratings, whether internal or external to the bank, are one of the important
cornerstones of the New Basel Accord.
Compared to Model II(c), Model II(d) allows for fixed eﬀects and firm specific error variances.
Model II(d) can also be compared to Model II(b) with rating information added. Although UL is
a bit higher for Model II(c) as compared to Model II(b), 0.84% vs. 0.80%, VaR numbers are lower
for all three VaR levels. For instance, at the 99.9% level, VaR is 4.81% compared to 5.11% for
Model II(b). Indeed, a quick glance across all models indicates that VaR is lowest for Model II(d).
Models III(a) and (b) add heterogeneous slopes to Model II(d), with Model III(b) also adding an
industry return factor. Overall the diﬀerence in risk is small. UL and VaR increase somewhat with
the addition of these parameters. Adding an industry factor above and beyond a market factor
with heterogeneous slopes makes little diﬀerence to the resulting loss distribution as is clear by
comparing Models III(a) and III(b). UL is nearly the same, 0.86% vs. 0.88%, as are VaR levels:
5.56% vs. 5.58% at the 99.9% VaR level.
Finally, the principal components model IV generates UL results which are similar to Model
II(c), which is Model I with ratings information, namely 1.08% vs. 1.07%. VaR, however, is higher.
For instance, 99.9% VaR is 7.69%, quite close to the 8% minimum capital requirement, compared
to 6.72% for Model II(c). In this way Model IV also generates tail losses which are higher than
Models III(a) and III(b). Although the PCA model performs best on an in-sample basis, the
recursive out-of-sample simulations do not seem to support the in-sample evidence.
Allowing for geographic heterogeneity in the simple Vasicek case helps as can be seen by the last
set of columns labeled “U.S. & Japan Modeled Separately.” For the Vasicek model this amounts to
doubling the number of parameters as there is one set for each country. UL drops by about 14%
from 1.47% to 1.29%, skewness and kurtosis both decline, as does VaR. For instance, 99.9% VaR
declines by nearly 20% from 12.05% tp 10.14%.
In general, however, pooled and separate country models generate similar loss distributions.
Modeling the U.S. and Japan separately usually results in lower risk for Models I and II(a). Once
firm specific slopes are allowed, as in Models III(a) and (b), VaR is actually slightly higher for the
separate country model, although the second through fourth moments are the same. For instance,
in the case of the basic CAPM model, Model III(a), 99.9% VaR increases from 5.56% to 5.75%. A
similar pattern can be seen when adding an industry factor in Model III(b). Model IV, however,
shows risk reduction by allowing for country heterogeneity. Moreover, the results for the last period
shown in Panel F, Table 9, indicates that even for the simple Vasicek model, Model I, pooling need
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not always increase risk: 99.9% VaR is 17.47% for the pooled model but 17.81% for the country
specific model. Indeed for this last period, allowing the parameters to vary by country increases
VaR for all models save the last one, Model IV. Some of these seemingly adverse results could be
due to parameter instability and the associated estimation errors. Nevertheless, the model ranking
is robust to comparisons over time, i.e. comparing Panels A through F. MHP:Overall it seems
that allowing for country specific factor loadings is more important than requiring diﬀerent country
models to have their own specific factors.
The diﬀerence in the loss distributions across models can also be seen in Figure 4 where we show
the loss densities for 2003 across the diﬀerent specifications (separate country models). There are
clearly important diﬀerences across the models. Relative to the Vasicek model which has only three
parameters per country (αc, βc, σc), the loss densities of the other models are not all that diﬀerent.
Adding just fixed eﬀects, Model II(a), does not seem to change the shape of the loss distribution.
However, once the firm error variances are allowed to diﬀer, Model II(b), the distributional shape
changes dramatically. Interestingly, Model II(c), which simply adds credit rating information to
the Model I specification (i.e. it adds just seven parameters per country) yields a loss distribution
which is remarkably similar to ones generated by the fully heterogeneous model specification. Credit
ratings seem indeed to be a useful and informative summary statistic for firm-level credit risk.
Moving down the panels in Table 9 we notice that the portfolio is getting riskier over time;
expected loss rises every year. If we compare value-at-risk, say at the 99.5%, for a model, say the
fixed eﬀects model with firm specific error variances and ratings (Model II(d)) applied to the two
countries separately, we see that VaR increases from 3.84% in 1998 to 5.56% in 2000 to 6.91% in
2003.
When considering credit risk, there are two types of parameter heterogeneity that should be
taken into account: firm returns and default thresholds (or distance to default). What is the impact
of one vs. the other? Table 10 seeks to address this question, where in Panel A we have repeated
several model results from Panel F in Table 9, namely the loss simulation results for the final year
under the basic same distance to default identification assumption given by (9). Panel B imposes
the other identifying assumption, namely the same default threshold λ as in (8). First, note that
by construction the two identification procedures are identical for Models I and II(c). Focusing on
the pooled models, we find that imposing (9) in Panel A generates levels of 99.9% value-at-risk
that are 4% (for Model II(a)) to 13% (for Model IV) higher than those generated by (8) in Panel
B. For instance, under (8) Model IV yields 99.9% VaR of 9.83% as seen in Panel B, far less than
99.9% VaR of 11.15% in Panel A. We are currently exploring more fully these results, but initial
closer examination reveals that imposing same DD, (9), generates more extreme tail events for
investment grade firms than does imposing same λ, (8), while the diﬀerences for speculative grade
firms are more modest.
What is clear from the discussion is that there is a rich and complex interaction between the
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underlying model parameters and the resulting loss distributions. Some of this complexity can
be summarized more simply using the default correlation ρ∗ij between any two firms i and j, as
computed in Section 9.4.1 where we discussed the default correlation by credit rating, ρ∗R. We
can conduct similar analysis across a broader set of models that use the same DD identifying
assumption, and these results are summarized in Table 11 for the year, 2003. We report the
portfolio EL for the year, 3.26%, which is the same across all models, the average return correlation
computed using (16), the average default correlation using (79) as well as portfolio loss volatility,
UL, taken from Table 9. Note that for the first two models, I and II(c), parameter restrictions result
in only one return correlation ρ for all firms. Through the introduction of ratings information and
consequently heterogeneity in unconditional default probabilities, we notice a sharp reduction in
average default correlation, ρ¯∗, from Model I, 1.81% to II(c), 0.26%. This trend continues when
we allow in addition for firm fixed eﬀects and firm-specific error variances, Model II(d), where
ρˆ
∗
= 0.18%. This reduction in average default correlation is accompanied by a reduction in UL, as
seen in the last column of Table 11.
Default correlation and UL exhibit a U-shaped relationship across models. Both risk measures
are highest for the simplest model, Model I, lowest for a model of intermediate complexity and
heterogeneity, Model II(d), and then rise again as we increase the heterogeneity in the conditional
mean specification. For instance, Model III(b), the two-factor model, has a higher average return
correlation than Model II(d), 10.35% vs. 9.06%, higher average default correlation, 0.33% vs.
0.18%, and also higher portfolio UL, 1.28% vs. 1.16%. Model IV, the PCA specification, is higher
still for all three of these measures. By allowing for firm specific error variances and making use
of credit ratings, Model II(d) allows for a high degree of heterogeneity in the default condition and
thereby allows for significant diversification of the idiosyncratic risk. The loss simulations are, of
course, conducted under the assumption of conditional independence, but Model II(d) imposes a
great deal of homogeneity on the conditional mean specification where the return correlation is
captured. As a means of comparison, the in-sample average pair-wise return correlations, on which
the parameter estimates for all models are based, is 15.45% (see Table 4, Panel F). The two-factor
model, III(b), comes closer to this value at 10.35% than does the simple firm fixed eﬀect model,
II(d), at 9.06%. So the low average default correlation and portfolio UL generated by Model II(d)
reflects, at least to some degree, the failure to properly account for all of the systematic risk, as
summarized by the average return correlation. In this way Model II(d) can be said to be overly
optimistic from the point of view of portfolio credit risk.
10 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered a simple model of credit risk and derived the limit distribution
of losses under diﬀerent assumptions regarding the structure of systematic risk and the scope of
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exposure or firm heterogeneity. The analytical and simulation results point to some interesting con-
clusions. Theory indicates that if the firm parameters are heterogeneous but come from a common
distribution, asymptotically there is no scope for further risk reduction through active portfolio
management. However, if the firm parameters come from diﬀerent distributions, say for diﬀerent
sectors or countries, then further risk reduction is possible, even asymptotically, by changing the
portfolio weights. In either case, neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to underestimation
of expected losses. Then once expected losses are controlled for, neglecting parameter hetero-
geneity can lead to overestimation of risk, whether measured by unexpected loss or value-at-risk.
Eﬀectively the loss distribution is more skewed and fat-tailed when heterogeneity is ignored.
In light of these observations a natural question is: which sources of heterogeneity are par-
ticularly important? Firm fixed eﬀects do not seem very important, particularly as compared to
allowing for variation in return error variances across firms. This can be accomplished either by al-
lowing each firm to have its own error variance or by appropriate grouping such as by credit rating.
Indeed going from one type to eﬀectively seven, one for each credit rating, with seven unconditional
default probabilities, seems to capture much of the relevant heterogeneity. Unfortunately there is
insuﬃcient data to meaningfully diﬀerentiate the unconditional default probabilities by rating and
by country.
Allowing for flexible factor sensitivities appears to be of secondary importance. Risk does not
seem to change much beyond Model III(a), the basic one-factor model. However, this is misleading.
Recall that all of the loss simulations are done under the assumption of conditional independence.
If this assumption is violated, i.e. if there remains cross-sectional dependence in the residuals from
the return regressions, then risk will be underestimated. Thus proper specification of the return
model is key, and here the addition of industry return factors and the concomitant heterogeneous
factor sensitivities, e.g. Model III(b), can become quite important.
The average pair-wise cross-sectional correlation of residuals are similar across the first set of
models which all have just a single factor. However, starting with Model III(b), those average
correlations decline (from about 23% to about 15%), and they become negligible, by construction,
with the PCA model. Indeed the risk forecast by those last three models (Model III(a) and (b),
Model IV) increases as the average pairwise correlation of residuals decreases. Put diﬀerently,
while Model IV is conditionally independent on an in-sample basis, Models III(a) and III(b) are
not. So long as on an out-of-sample basis Model IV is still closer to conditional independence than
Models III(a) and III(b), the latter will generate lower, risk forecasts than the former. Measuring
and evaluating out-of-sample conditional dependence is an important topic which requires further
investigation.
Finally, the diﬀerences in pooled versus country specific results suggest that further sub-dividing
the firm return specification and error variances by country matters less. Indeed, the diﬀerences
within a given model in the pooled approach compared with modeling the two countries separately
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are generally smaller than the diﬀerences across models for a given approach. Thus allowing for
country specific factor loadings is important, but requiring country specific factors is less so.
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A Principal Components Model
For the principal components model where
ri,t+1 = αi + β0ift+1 + ui,t+1, t = 1, ..., T
the estimates of ft+1 can be computed by application of principal component techniques to the stan-
dardized returns defined by (ri,t+1 − r¯i) /σˆi, where r¯i =
PT
t=1 ri,t+1/T, and σˆi =
PT
t=1 (ri,t+1 − r¯i)
2 /(T−
1). The number of factors, m, can be selected using the Bai and Ng (2002) procedure.
Denote the number of selected factors by mˆ and estimated factors by fˆt+1, and suppose that
they are subject to the orthonormalization restrictions such that37
(T )−1
TX
t=1
fˆt+1fˆ
0
t+1 = Imˆ, T
−1
TX
t=1
fˆt+1 = 0. (80)
The estimates of αi and βi will be given by
αˆi = T
−1
TX
t=1
ri,t+1 = r¯i, βˆi = T−1
TX
t=1
(ri,t+1)ˆft+1,
and
σˆ2i = (T − mˆ− 1)−1
TX
t=1
³
ri,t+1 − aˆi − βˆ
0
ifˆt+1
´2
. (81)
B Simulation of Returns and Associated Loss Distributions
To simulate h−period ahead individual firm returns, Ri,t+h ≡
Ph
l=1 ri,t+l, according to (71) we
need to simulate ft+l, and ui,t+l, for l = 1, 2, .., h. We assume that the common factors are serially
uncorrelated. This seems justified in our application where market returns are only very weakly
autocorrelated. Taking first the case of a single market factor, suppose that
r¯t+l ∼ iidN(r¯, s2r¯),
r¯ = T−1
TX
t=1
r¯t, s2r¯ = (T − 1)−1
TX
t=1
(r¯t − r¯)2 ,
and
ui,t+l ∼ iidN(0, σˆ2i ).
Then return for the ith firm can be simulated as
r(s)i,t+l = αˆi + βˆir¯
(s)
t+l + σˆiε
(s)
i,t+l,
37For computational convenience, we actually impose the restriction that the sample covariance matrix (T −
1)−1
ST
t=1 fˆt+1fˆ
0
t+1 = Imˆ.
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r¯(s)t+l ∼ iidN(r¯, s
2
r¯), ε
(s)
i,t+l ∼ iidN(0, 1)
where s = 1, 2, .., S are the replications.
For the principal components model where the factors satisfy the orthonormalization restrictions
(80), returns for the ith firm can be simulated as
r(s)i,t+l = αˆi + β
0
if
(s)
t+l + σˆiε
(s)
i,t+l,
f
(s)
t+l ∼ iidN(0, Imˆ), ε
(s)
i,t+l ∼ iidN(0, 1).
For the more general multi-factor case, let µf denote the mean and Σf the covariance matrix of
ft+l. Then returns for the ith firm can be simulated as
r(s)i,t+l = αˆi + β
0
if
(s)
t+l + σˆiε
(s)
i,t+l,
f
(s)
t+l ∼ iidN(µf ,Σf ), ε
(s)
i,t+l ∼ iidN(0, 1).
Portfolio loss at horizon h can now be simulated using
l(s)t+h = Vp
"
NX
i=1
wiI
³
λˆi,t+h −R(s)i,t+h
´#
,
where R(s)i,t+h ≡
Ph
l=1 r
(s)
i,t+l is the h-period cumulative return, λˆi,t+h is the h-period default return
threshold, Vp is the face value of the whole portfolio (e.g. $1bn) and wi is the fraction of exposure to
obligor i. We assume for simplicity that defaulted instruments have no recovery value. Simulated
expected loss due to default is given by
l¯S,t+h =
1
S
SX
s=1
l(s)t+h.
The higher order moments of the loss distribution can be similarly simulated.
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Table 4 
Average Pair-wise Correlation of Returns and  
In-sample Residuals Based on Ten-Year Rolling Windows 
 
     Average Pair-wise Correlation of Residuals 
 Sample Average Pair-wise Correlation of Returns   US & Japan Pooled  US & Japan Modeled Separately
 Window US&JP US JP Model Specifications US&JP US JP  US&JP US JP 
Panel A 1988-1997 0.1937 0.1933 0.6011 I Vasicek 0.0222 0.0951 0.4217   0.0239 0.0365 0.0607 
      II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) 0.0222 0.0951 0.4217  0.0239 0.0365 0.0607 
 Sample Size 839 628 211 II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) 0.0228 0.0789 0.4490  0.0232 0.0361 0.0606 
      III(a) CAPM 0.0218 0.0797 0.3868  0.0242 0.0374 0.0639 
      III(b) Sector CAPM 0.0147 0.0711 0.3869  0.0142 0.0221 0.0227 
      IV PCA -0.0001 0.0016 0.0037  0.0000 0.0005 -0.0045 
Panel B 1989-1998 0.2150 0.2114 0.5913 I Vasicek 0.0235 0.0940 0.3793   0.0249 0.0440 0.0633 
      II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) 0.0235 0.0940 0.3793  0.0249 0.0440 0.0633 
 Sample Size 854 633 221 II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) 0.0241 0.0802 0.4059  0.0246 0.0438 0.0629 
      III(a) CAPM 0.0237 0.0825 0.3553  0.0255 0.0456 0.0666 
      III(b) Sector CAPM 0.0177 0.0773 0.3582  0.0193 0.0324 0.0258 
         IV PCA 0.0003 0.0011 0.0028   0.0000 0.0004 -0.0041 
Panel C 1990-1999 0.2097 0.2237 0.5666 I Vasicek 0.0533 0.1282 0.3917   0.0627 0.0731 0.1391 
      II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) 0.0533 0.1282 0.3917  0.0627 0.0731 0.1391 
 Sample Size 842 613 229 II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) 0.0543 0.1187 0.4112  0.0620 0.0736 0.1392 
      III(a) CAPM 0.0568 0.1246 0.3807  0.0661 0.0778 0.1473 
      III(b) Sector CAPM 0.0419 0.1168 0.3817  0.0417 0.0621 0.0390 
         IV PCA 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010   -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0036 
Panel D 1991-2000 0.1391 0.1691 0.4638 I Vasicek 0.0533 0.1207 0.3427  0.0633 0.0783 0.1359 
      II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) 0.0533 0.1207 0.3427  0.0633 0.0783 0.1359 
 Sample Size 816 588 228 II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) 0.0540 0.1142 0.3589  0.0607 0.0788 0.1372 
      III(a) CAPM 0.0559 0.1206 0.3442  0.0649 0.0821 0.1428 
      III(b) Sector CAPM 0.0379 0.1039 0.3470  0.0392 0.0615 0.0427 
      IV PCA 0.0000 0.0018 0.0030  0.0002 0.0008 -0.0041 
Panel E 1992-2001 0.1309 0.1633 0.4411 I Vasicek 0.0482 0.1132 0.3282   0.0578 0.0740 0.1277 
      II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) 0.0482 0.1132 0.3282  0.0578 0.0740 0.1277 
 Sample Size 811 585 226 II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) 0.0490 0.1074 0.3436  0.0545 0.0745 0.1290 
      III(a) CAPM 0.0501 0.1135 0.3324  0.0583 0.0772 0.1339 
      III(b) Sector CAPM 0.0378 0.1077 0.3361  0.0381 0.0624 0.0421 
         IV PCA -0.0007 0.0001 0.0009   -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0042 
Panel F 1993-2002 0.1545 0.1999 0.4191 I Vasicek 0.0549 0.1098 0.3332  0.0628 0.0772 0.1254 
      II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) 0.0549 0.1098 0.3332  0.0628 0.0772 0.1254 
 Sample Size 818 600 218 II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) 0.0556 0.1097 0.3377  0.0600 0.0780 0.1270 
      III(a) CAPM 0.0569 0.1157 0.3488  0.0641 0.0811 0.1324 
      III(b) Sector CAPM 0.0439 0.1099 0.3543  0.0426 0.0658 0.0391 
         IV PCA -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0001   -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0043 
 
Note: This table presents the results of recursive estimation of return equations using quarterly return data. All estimation results are 
calculated using a 40-quarter rolling window. The table presents estimation results for the "pooled" country models in the first set of 
columns and the "separate" country models in the second set of columns. Portfolio determination and sample construction are discussed 
in Section 9.1. Specification of the return models is discussed in Section 9.2 (see Table 3 for further detail). The data source for returns 
of U.S. firms is CRSP. The source for Japanese firms is Datastream. Yen-denominated Japanese returns are converted to USD-
denominated returns by subtracting the percentage change in the Yen/USD exchange rate.
 51
Table 5 
Testing for ARCH Effects in Model III(a) CAPM 
 
 % of Firms with Significant ARCH Effects 
 Nominal Significance Level = 5% 
Sample US & Japan Pooled US & Japan Modeled Separately 
Window US&JP US JP US&JP US JP 
1988-1997 6.56% 4.94% 11.37%  5.24% 4.94% 6.16% 
1989-1998 6.32% 4.27% 12.22%  5.85% 5.06% 8.14% 
1990-1999 7.72% 5.55% 13.54% 6.29% 4.89% 10.04% 
1991-2000 9.56% 8.33% 12.72% 10.05% 9.35% 11.84% 
1992-2001 9.62% 8.55% 12.39% 10.11% 9.40% 11.95% 
1993-2002 9.90% 9.33% 11.47%  9.41% 9.00% 10.55% 
 
Note: The table reports the result of tests for GARCH effects conducted using recursive estimation results for Model III(a) - "CAPM" - presented in Table 4. Tests are carried out 
using Engle's (1982) Lagrange Multiplier Test. The figure reports the percentage of firms that have ARCH effects at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 6 
Analytical and Simulated Loss Distribution Results for Vasicek Model 
Based on U.S. & Japan Pooled Return Specifications 
Simulation    Portfolio Size  UL  99.0% VaR  99.5% VaR  99.9% VaR 
Year πˆ  ρˆ   N N*  Anal. Simul. Granul.  Anal. Simul. Granul.  Anal. Simul. Granul.  Anal. Simul. Granul. 
1998 1.23% 13.83%   839 638  1.40% 1.47% 0.07%  6.81% 7.00% 0.19%  8.23% 8.48% 0.26%  11.82% 12.05% 0.23% 
1999 1.60% 15.69%  854 635  1.89% 1.94% 0.05%  9.17% 9.30% 0.13%  11.07% 11.13% 0.06%  15.84% 15.91% 0.07% 
2000 2.10% 13.71%  842 613  2.14% 2.22% 0.08%  10.35% 10.65% 0.30%  12.25% 12.59% 0.33%  16.92% 17.34% 0.42% 
2001 2.27% 8.00%  816 619  1.65% 1.75% 0.10%  8.08% 8.39% 0.31%  9.24% 9.66% 0.42%  12.01% 12.72% 0.71% 
2002 2.73% 7.71%  811 642  1.88% 1.98% 0.10%  9.22% 9.48% 0.26%  10.47% 10.74% 0.27%  13.42% 13.71% 0.29% 
2003 3.26% 9.20%   818 654  2.38% 2.48% 0.10%  11.61% 11.92% 0.31%  13.23% 13.59% 0.36%  17.06% 17.47% 0.41% 
 
Note: This table reports comparisons of our simulated loss distributions for the U.S. & Japan Pooled Vasicek model (Model I) with analytical results for an infinitely large 
portfolio. πˆ  is the portfolio EL and ρˆ  is estimated using equation (76). N is the number of obligors in our portfolio. N* = ( Σ wi2 )-1 is the equivalent number of equal weighted 
exposures. Analytical Unexpected Loss (UL) and Value-at-Risk (VaR) are computed using the expressions given in Vasicek (2002). Granularity is Simulated minus Analytical 
UL. The simulation procedure is discussed in Appendix B. All simulations are carried out using 200,000 replications. 
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Table 7 
Simulated (Out-of-Sample) Default Correlations for 2003 
Based on Model II(c) for U.S. & Japan Pooled Return Specification 
 
 Panel A: Default Probabilities (in basis points) and Correlations by Credit Rating 
         
  ˆRπ  ρˆ  *ˆRρ      
 AAA & AA 0.10 9.20% 0.004%     
 A 0.58 9.20% 0.018%     
 BBB 10.59 9.20% 0.170%     
 BB 63.03 9.20% 0.615%     
 B 542.88 9.20% 2.437%     
 CCC 4,977.60 9.20% 5.865%     
         
         
 Panel B: Default Correlations by Credit Rating 
         
  AAA & AA A BBB BB B CCC  
 AAA & AA 0.004% - - - - -  
 A 0.009% 0.018% - - - -  
 BBB 0.026% 0.054% 0.170% - - -  
 BB 0.048% 0.100% 0.320% 0.615% - -  
 B 0.086% 0.183% 0.607% 1.199% 2.437% -  
 CCC 0.102% 0.224% 0.792% 1.636% 3.560% 5.865%  
 
Note: This table reports simulated (out-of-sample) default correlations by rating for Model II(c) for the final simulation year, 2003. Recall that for the pooled version of Model 
II(c) the pair-wise correlation of defaults is the same for all firms and is the same as in the Vasicek model (i.e. ,ˆ ˆ ,i j i jρ ρ= ∀  where ρˆ  is given by equation (76)).  Pair-wise 
correlations of simulated (out-of-sample) defaults are obtained as described in Section 9.4.1 using equation (77). 
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Table 8 
The Impact of Parameter Heterogeneity on the Loss Distribution 
 
Panel A The Impact on Expected Losses (EL) of Allowing for Fixed Effects   
     
  Simulated EL  
 Year Vasicek Fixed Effect  
 1998 1.23% 1.72%  
 1999 1.60% 2.17%  
 2000 2.10% 2.67%  
 2001 2.28% 2.93%  
 2002 2.74% 3.28%  
 2003 3.26% 3.65%  
     
Panel B The Impact on Unexpected Losses (UL) of Allowing for Fixed Effects  
     
  Simulated UL  
 Year Vasicek Fixed Effect (σ²)  
 1998 1.47% 1.39%  
 1999 1.94% 1.84%  
 2000 2.22% 2.10%  
 2001 1.75% 1.68%  
 2002 1.98% 1.90%  
 2003 2.48% 2.40%  
     
 
Note: The results in Panel A compare Expected Losses (EL) for the U.S. & Japan Pooled version of Model I (Vasicek) with EL allowing for firm fixed effects, iα , where we have 
deliberately not equalized EL with Model I. The results in Panel B compare Unexpected Losses (UL) for the U.S. & Japan Pooled version of the Vasicek model (Model I) with UL 
for Model II(a) - Fixed Effect. In Panel B, we have equalized EL across the two models for each year. The simulation procedure is discussed in Appendix B. All simulations are 
carried out using 200,000 replications. 
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Table 9 
Out-of-Sample Simulated Annual Losses Based on 10-Year Rolling Return Regressions 
200,000 replications 
 
       US & Japan Pooled  US & Japan Modeled Separately  
 Simulation Using   Default     Value-at-Risk     Value-at-Risk  
 Year Sample Model Specifications Thresholds  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  
Panel A 1998 1988-1997 I Vasicek λc /  DDc   1.47% 3.1 19.5 7.00% 8.48% 12.05%   1.29% 2.6 15.5 6.10% 7.22% 10.14%  
    II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) λc /  DDc,i  1.39% 2.8 16.9 6.57% 7.86% 11.14%  1.23% 2.5 14.2 5.80% 6.82% 9.51%  
    II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λc /  DDc,i  0.80% 1.1 5.1 3.67% 4.08% 5.11%  0.77% 1.1 6.9 3.47% 3.82% 4.75%  
 πˆ = 1.23% II(c) Rating (σ²) λi /  DDR  1.07% 1.3 5.8 4.57% 5.19% 6.72%  1.01% 1.1 5.1 4.30% 4.81% 6.17%  
    II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λi /  DDR  0.84% 0.7 3.9 3.55% 3.89% 4.81%  0.83% 0.7 4.0 3.48% 3.84% 4.74%  
    III(a) CAPM λi /  DDR  0.86% 1.0 5.9 3.73% 4.19% 5.56%  0.88% 1.0 5.7 3.82% 4.33% 5.75%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM λi /  DDR  0.88% 1.0 6.1 3.81% 4.32% 5.58%  0.90% 1.1 5.9 3.89% 4.42% 5.81%  
     IV PCA λi /  DDR   1.08% 1.6 8.8 4.82% 5.62% 7.69%   1.07% 1.5 7.8 4.74% 5.47% 7.30%  
Panel B 1999 1989-1998 I Vasicek λc /  DDc   1.94% 3.0 18.1 9.30% 11.13% 15.91%   1.73% 2.8 17.9 8.25% 9.77% 14.04%  
    II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) λc /  DDc,i  1.84% 2.8 16.3 8.76% 10.43% 14.75%  1.65% 2.7 16.3 7.86% 9.31% 13.12%  
    II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λc /  DDc,i  1.02% 1.3 6.2 4.84% 5.43% 6.86%  0.97% 1.7 13.9 4.55% 5.15% 7.02%  
 πˆ = 1.60% II(c) Rating (σ²) λi /  DDR  1.28% 1.4 6.7 5.80% 6.62% 8.52%  1.21% 1.4 6.7 5.50% 6.23% 7.95%  
    II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λi /  DDR  0.95% 0.8 4.4 4.36% 4.81% 5.81%  0.93% 0.9 5.7 4.29% 4.76% 5.87%  
    III(a) CAPM λi /  DDR  0.95% 1.3 8.2 4.53% 5.16% 6.93%  0.98% 1.4 8.7 4.67% 5.35% 7.06%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM λi /  DDR  0.99% 1.2 7.4 4.64% 5.31% 7.06%  1.04% 1.5 8.9 4.88% 5.59% 7.67%  
     IV PCA λi /  DDR   1.20% 1.7 9.3 5.69% 6.58% 8.88%   1.20% 1.8 10.4 5.72% 6.70% 8.95%  
Panel C 2000 1990-1999 I Vasicek λc /  DDc  2.22% 2.6 14.7 10.65% 12.59% 17.34%  2.06% 2.4 12.7 9.78% 11.61% 15.87%  
    II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) λc /  DDc,i  2.10% 2.4 13.1 10.03% 11.81% 16.17%  1.97% 2.3 11.7 9.34% 10.97% 14.87%  
    II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λc /  DDc,i  1.29% 1.4 6.9 6.29% 7.06% 8.99%  1.21% 1.3 7.9 5.85% 6.59% 8.69%  
 πˆ = 2.10% II(c) Rating (σ²) λi /  DDR  1.43% 1.2 5.5 6.56% 7.35% 9.18%  1.39% 1.1 5.3 6.37% 7.17% 8.91%  
    II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λi /  DDR  1.08% 0.6 3.9 5.07% 5.54% 6.63%  1.07% 0.7 4.1 5.08% 5.56% 6.75%  
    III(a) CAPM λi /  DDR  1.05% 1.0 6.3 5.23% 5.85% 7.54%  1.12% 1.1 6.1 5.51% 6.21% 7.99%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM λi /  DDR  1.09% 1.0 5.7 5.33% 5.94% 7.56%  1.19% 1.1 6.2 5.74% 6.45% 8.25%  
     IV PCA λi /  DDR   1.39% 1.5 7.7 6.68% 7.69% 10.16%   1.40% 1.6 8.4 6.77% 7.79% 10.46%  
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Table 9 (continued) 
Out-of-Sample Simulated Annual Losses Based on 10-Year Rolling Return Regressions 
200,000 replications 
       US & Japan Pooled  US & Japan Modeled Separately  
 Simulation Using   Default     Value-at-Risk     Value-at-Risk  
 Year Sample Model Specifications Thresholds  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  
Panel D  2001 1991-2000 I Vasicek λc /  DDc   1.75% 1.8 8.6 8.39% 9.66% 12.72%   1.72% 1.7 8.2 8.20% 9.38% 12.04%  
    II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) λc /  DDc,i  1.68% 1.7 7.8 8.00% 9.22% 12.05%  1.65% 1.6 7.4 7.81% 8.91% 11.31%  
    II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λc /  DDc,i  1.08% 0.9 4.3 5.46% 5.96% 7.19%  1.08% 0.8 4.2 5.42% 5.88% 7.01%  
 πˆ = 2.28% II(c) Rating (σ²) λi /  DDR  1.22% 0.7 3.8 5.71% 6.23% 7.38%  1.23% 0.7 3.9 5.71% 6.23% 7.40%  
    II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λi /  DDR  1.00% 0.4 3.1 4.84% 5.15% 5.86%  1.02% 0.4 3.2 4.92% 5.28% 5.99%  
    III(a) CAPM λi /  DDR  1.13% 0.8 4.4 5.54% 6.09% 7.46%  1.20% 0.8 4.5 5.76% 6.31% 7.69%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM λi /  DDR  1.18% 0.7 4.2 5.64% 6.20% 7.57%  1.27% 0.8 4.4 5.96% 6.58% 8.06%  
     IV PCA λi /  DDR   1.44% 1.1 5.4 6.74% 7.55% 9.49%   1.44% 1.1 5.5 6.75% 7.57% 9.66%  
Panel E 2002 1992-2001 I Vasicek λc /  DDc   1.98% 1.6 7.3 9.48% 10.74% 13.71%   1.96% 1.6 7.5 9.45% 10.62% 13.65%  
    II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) λc /  DDc,i  1.90% 1.6 6.9 9.15% 10.32% 12.97%  1.90% 1.6 7.0 9.17% 10.28% 13.06%  
    II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λc /  DDc,i  1.23% 0.9 4.5 6.44% 7.05% 8.37%  1.23% 0.9 4.8 6.40% 6.98% 8.48%  
 πˆ = 2.74% II(c) Rating (σ²) λi /  DDR  1.34% 0.5 3.4 6.32% 6.80% 7.91%  1.35% 0.6 3.5 6.39% 6.91% 8.07%  
    II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λi /  DDR  1.10% 0.3 2.9 5.43% 5.76% 6.47%  1.11% 0.3 3.1 5.52% 5.86% 6.66%  
    III(a) CAPM λi /  DDR  1.16% 0.5 3.7 5.87% 6.38% 7.55%  1.22% 0.6 3.9 6.08% 6.61% 7.89%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM λi /  DDR  1.19% 0.6 3.8 5.98% 6.50% 7.73%  1.26% 0.7 4.1 6.25% 6.82% 8.23%  
     IV PCA λi /  DDR   1.42% 0.9 4.8 6.95% 7.68% 9.43%   1.44% 1.0 5.2 7.03% 7.81% 9.86%  
Panel F 2003 1993-2002 I Vasicek λc /  DDc  2.48% 1.8 8.0 11.92% 13.59% 17.47%  2.56% 1.8 8.2 12.20% 13.89% 17.81%  
    II(a) Fixed Effect (σ²) λc /  DDc,i  2.40% 1.7 7.5 11.54% 13.06% 16.84%  2.48% 1.7 7.8 11.84% 13.46% 17.07%  
    II(b) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λc /  DDc,i  1.53% 1.1 5.3 8.02% 8.84% 10.73%  1.60% 1.2 5.8 8.33% 9.22% 11.37%  
 πˆ = 3.26% II(c) Rating (σ²) λi /  DDR  1.51% 0.6 3.7 7.46% 8.06% 9.46%  1.56% 0.7 3.9 7.65% 8.28% 9.86%  
    II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i ) λi /  DDR  1.16% 0.3 3.2 6.24% 6.64% 7.53%  1.22% 0.4 3.5 6.46% 6.91% 7.95%  
    III(a) CAPM λi /  DDR  1.27% 0.8 4.7 6.98% 7.64% 9.21%  1.27% 0.8 5.0 7.00% 7.66% 9.30%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM λi /  DDR  1.28% 0.8 4.7 7.01% 7.64% 9.20%  1.30% 0.9 5.2 7.15% 7.83% 9.60%  
     IV PCA λi /  DDR   1.51% 1.1 5.9 7.96% 8.93% 11.15%   1.49% 1.2 6.2 7.91% 8.85% 11.11%  
Note: This table presents results for simulated out-of-sample annual loss distributions (4-quarter ahead loss distributions). The table presents simulation results for the "pooled" 
country models in the first set of columns and the "separate" country models in the second set of columns. Model specifications, including both the return specification and 
determination of default threshold λ, are discussed in Section 9.2 (see Table 3 for more detail on the model specifications). The simulation routine is discussed in Appendix B. 
Simulation are carried out using 200,000 replications. All models for each year are calibrated to have the same Expect Loss given by πˆ . For each simulation, the table reports the 
standard deviation of losses (denoted Unexpected Losses - UL), the 3rd and 4th moments of the loss distributions, as well as the 99.0%, 99.5% and 99.9% quantiles of the 
distribution (denoted Value-at-Risk). 
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Table 10 
Comparison of Alternative Methods of Identification of Default Thresholds (2003) 
200,000 replications 
Panel A: Same Distance to Default by Rating: DDR                
      US & Japan Pooled  US & Japan Modeled Separately  
 Simulation Using       Value-at-Risk     Value-at-Risk  
 Year Sample Model Specifications  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  
 2003 1993-2002 I Vasicek   2.48% 1.8 8.0 11.92% 13.59% 17.47%   2.56% 1.8 8.2 12.20% 13.89% 17.81%  
    II(c) Rating (σ²)  1.51% 0.6 3.7 7.46% 8.06% 9.46%  1.56% 0.7 3.9 7.65% 8.28% 9.86%  
 πˆ = 3.26% II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i )  1.16% 0.3 3.2 6.24% 6.64% 7.53%  1.22% 0.4 3.5 6.46% 6.91% 7.95%  
   III(a) CAPM  1.27% 0.8 4.7 6.98% 7.64% 9.21%  1.27% 0.8 5.0 7.00% 7.66% 9.30%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM  1.28% 0.8 4.7 7.01% 7.64% 9.20%  1.30% 0.9 5.2 7.15% 7.83% 9.60%  
     IV PCA   1.51% 1.1 5.9 7.96% 8.93% 11.15%   1.49% 1.2 6.2 7.91% 8.85% 11.11%  
                    
                    
Panel B: Same Default Threshold by Rating: λR                
      US & Japan Pooled  US & Japan Modeled Separately  
 Simulation Using       Value-at-Risk     Value-at-Risk  
 Year Sample Model Specifications  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  UL Skew. Kurt. 99.0% 99.5% 99.9%  
 2003 1993-2002 I Vasicek   2.48% 1.8 8.0 11.92% 13.59% 17.47%   2.56% 1.8 8.2 12.20% 13.89% 17.81%  
    II(c) Rating (σ²)  1.51% 0.6 3.7 7.46% 8.06% 9.46%  1.56% 0.7 3.9 7.65% 8.28% 9.86%  
 πˆ = 3.26% II(d) Fixed Effect ( σ²i )  1.08% 0.2 2.9 5.90% 6.22% 6.85%  1.12% 0.2 3.0 6.04% 6.37% 7.09%  
   III(a) CAPM  1.23% 0.7 4.1 6.76% 7.36% 8.63%  1.21% 0.6 4.1 6.64% 7.19% 8.53%  
    III(b) Sector CAPM  1.25% 0.7 4.2 6.81% 7.42% 8.76%  1.24% 0.7 4.4 6.83% 7.43% 8.86%  
     IV PCA   1.42% 0.8 4.6 7.44% 8.18% 9.83%   1.39% 0.9 4.8 7.39% 8.13% 9.82%  
 
Note: This table compares the two identification methods for default thresholds discussed in Section 3 for the final simulation year, 2003. Panel A repeats the five models from 
Table 9 that are calibrated according to the identifying restriction (11), same distance-to-default by rating. Panel B presents results for these models using identifying restriction 
(10), namely that all firms with a given rating have the same default threshold, λR. For the "separate" country models, we only impose that all firms in a given country with the 
same rating have the same threshold λR,c. Thus, there are 7 thresholds for the "pooled" models and 14 thresholds for the "separate" country models. The simulation routine is 
discussed in Appendix B. Simulations are carried out using 200,000 replications. All models for each year are calibrated to have the same Expected Loss given by πˆ . For each 
simulation, the table reports the standard deviation of losses (denoted Unexpected Losses - UL), the 3rd and 4th moments of the loss distributions, as well as the 99.0%, 99.5% and 
99.9% quantiles of the distribution (denoted Value-at-Risk). 
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Table 11 
Comparison of ,ˆi jρ  and ,*ˆ i jρ  for Models Using Same Distance to Default Identification (2003) 
Based on U.S. and Japan Pooled Return Specifications 
 
Simulation Using    Simulated 
Year Sample Model Specifications Parameter Restrictions ,ˆi jρ  *,ˆi jρ  UL 
2003 1993-2002 I Vasicek  
* *
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ; , ,i i j i ji i jπ π ρ ρ ρ ρ= ∀ = = ∀  9.20% 1.80% 2.48% 
   II(c) Rating (σ2) 
* *
, , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ; , ; ,i R i j i j R Ri R i j i R j Rπ π ρ ρ ρ ρ ′ ′= ∀ ∈ = ∀ = ∀ ∈ ∈  9.20% 0.26% 1.51% 
πˆ = 3.26% II(d) Fixed Effects (σi2) ˆ ˆ ;i R i Rπ π= ∀ ∈  9.06% 0.18% 1.16% 
   III(a) CAPM ˆ ˆ ;i R i Rπ π= ∀ ∈  10.09% 0.32% 1.27% 
   III(b) Sector/ CAPM ˆ ˆ ;i R i Rπ π= ∀ ∈  10.35% 0.33% 1.28% 
    IV PCA  ˆ ˆ ;i R i Rπ π= ∀ ∈  14.77% 0.80% 1.51% 
 
Note: This table compares the average pair-wise correlation of simulated (out-of-sample) returns, ,ˆi jρ , and the average pair-wise correlation of simulated (out-of-sample) defaults, 
*
,ˆi jρ , across models for the final simulation year, 2003.  These results are only presented for the 6 models that use the same distance-to-default identifying restriction, (11).  Pair-
wise correlations of simulated (out-of-sample) returns, ,ˆ i jρ , are given by equation (18).  Pair-wise correlations of simulated (out-of-sample) defaults, *,ˆi jρ ,are obtained using 
equation (77) as described in Section 9.4.1. 
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Figure 1 
Relationship between Default Correlation (ρ*) and Return Correlation (ρ) for different values  
of the degrees of freedom of the Student t-distribution (υ) and default probability (π) 
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Note: * *( , , )ρ ρ π ρ υ=  is calculated using equation (37) for the Student t-distribution and using equation (33) for the Gaussian case.  The expectations in equations (33) and 
(37) are evaluated using 1 million draws of ft+1. 
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Figure 2 
Kernel Density Estimates of Estimated Betas  
(U.S. versus Japan, 1988-1997) 
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Note: Estimated betas are from Model III(a) – CAPM where U.S. & Japan are modeled separately.  All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s 
(1986) optimal bandwidth. 
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Figure 3a 
Kernel Density Estimates of Estimated Betas 
(U.S. Betas over Time) 
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Note: Estimated betas are from Model III(a) – CAPM where U.S. & Japan are modeled separately. All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s 
(1986) optimal bandwidth. 
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Figure 3b 
Kernel Density Estimates of Estimated Betas 
(Japanese Betas over Time) 
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Note: Estimated betas are from Model III(a) – CAPM where U.S. & Japan are modeled separately. All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s 
(1986) optimal bandwidth. 
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Figure 4 
Alternative Simulated Loss Densities 
(U.S. and Japan Modeled Separately, 2003) 
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Note: All densities are estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s (1986) optimal bandwidth. 
